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Novel Alert Visualization: The Development of a Visual Analytics
Prototype for Mitigation of Malicious Insider Cyber Threats
by
Karla A. Clarke
June 2018
Cyber insider threat is one of the most difficult risks to mitigate in organizations.
However, innovative validated visualizations for cyber analysts to better decipher and
react to detected anomalies has not been reported in literature or in industry. Attacks
caused by malicious insiders can cause millions of dollars in losses to an organization.
Though there have been advances in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) over the last
three decades, traditional IDSs do not specialize in anomaly identification caused by
insiders. There is also a profuse amount of data being presented to cyber analysts when
deciphering big data and reacting to data breach incidents using complex information
systems.
Information visualization is pertinent to the identification and mitigation of malicious
cyber insider threats. The main goal of this study was to develop and validate, using
Subject Matter Experts (SME), an executive insider threat dashboard visualization
prototype. Using the developed prototype, an experimental study was conducted,
which aimed to assess the perceived effectiveness in enhancing the analysts’ interface
when complex data correlations are presented to mitigate malicious insiders cyber threats.
Dashboard-based visualization techniques could be used to give full visibility of network
progress and problems in real-time, especially within complex and stressful
environments. For instance, in an Emergency Room (ER), there are four main vital signs
used for urgent patient triage. Cybersecurity vital signs can give cyber analysts clear focal
points during high severity issues. Pilots must expeditiously reference the Heads Up
Display (HUD), which presents only key indicators to make critical decisions during
unwarranted deviations or an immediate threat.
Current dashboard-based visualization techniques have yet to be fully validated within
the field of cybersecurity. This study developed a visualization prototype based on SME
input utilizing the Delphi method. SMEs validated the perceived effectiveness of several
different types of the developed visualization dashboard. Quantitative analysis of SME’s
perceived effectiveness via self-reported value and satisfaction data as well as qualitative
analysis of feedback provided during the experiments using the prototype developed were
performed.

ii

This study identified critical cyber visualization variables and identified visualization
techniques. The identifications were then used to develop QUICK.v™ a prototype to be
used when mitigating potentially malicious cyber insider threats. The perceived
effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was then validated. Insights from this study can aid
organizations in enhancing cybersecurity dashboard visualizations by depicting only
critical cybersecurity vital signs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
Big data analytics is altering cybersecurity in a potentially disruptive way by
introducing profuse amounts of massively incomplete sets of data (Kott, Swami, &
McDaniel, 2014). Big data is also used to detect the threat of a cyber attack or potentially
cyberterrorism, hence, the need for data to be protected from unauthorized access, use, or
manipulation (AlMutairi, Abdullah, AlBukhary, & Kar, 2015). Data is accelerating
remarkably fast (Geer Jr., 2011). Data is defined as “a subset of information in electronic
format that may be retrieved or transmitted” (NIST, 2013). “As information spaces
expand in size and complexity, there is a growing need for visual representations that
help us make better sense of diverse data relations and patterns” (Dork, Carpendale, &
Williamson, 2011, p. 20). There are many challenges faced when deciphering large
volumes and varieties of data within complex information systems (Shneiderman &
Plaisant, 2015). A particularly complex challenge faced is dealing with malicious insider
cyber threats (Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). Malicious cyber insiders may aim to
inconspicuously exfiltrate large volumes of data within an organization (Agrafiotis et al.,
2015). Thus, cyber analysts are presented profuse amounts of alerts when using data
visualizations to address the challenge of deciphering and reacting to big data within
complex information systems, resulting in information overload (“Big Data Meets”,
2012).

2
Quickly analyzing overwhelming amounts of data and responding during a
malicious insider attack not only requires analytics tools but also human judgment (Gorg,
Kang, Liu, & Stasko, 2013). According to Gorg et al. (2013), “the analysis process
requires human judgment to make the best possible evaluation of incomplete,
inconsistent, and potentially deceptive information in the face of rapidly changing
situations” (p. 30). Cyber analysts have to perceptively determine how to react during an
attack, while they may be inadequately equipped based on the visualization being used.
Analytics tools are most useful if the cyber analyst can focus their attention by utilizing a
systematic and focused visualization, which aided in sharpening the analytic focus,
essentially allowing analysts to find patterns and anomalies of interest (Shneiderman &
Plaisant, 2015). Staheli, Mancuso, Leahy, and Kalke (2016) addressed data visualization
challenges faced within the Department of Defense (DoD) by developing a cyber
dashboard. They noted that within cybersecurity incorporating hundreds of data sources
could be very difficult, requiring the need for this level of incorporation is a vital element
for future designs. Future designs need to address the prevalent visual analytics challenge
when examining data from multiple sources (Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). This study
aims to develop and validate a visualization prototype that intends to enhance the
presentation of complex data correlations. The study addressed the need for further
analysis of end-user specifications for the development of a cybersecurity visualization
dashboard (Inibhunu et al., 2016; Agrafiotis et al., 2015; McKenna, Staheli, & Meter,
2015). The findings of this research add to the Information Systems (IS) and Information
Security (InfoSec) body of knowledge by developing a novel and effective detection
method for the identification of anomalous activities when mitigating malicious insider
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cyber threats.
A visualization dashboard was also developed that presents cybersecurity ‘vital
signs’, by assessing the perceived effectiveness of enhancing the presentation of complex
data correlations when mitigating malicious insiders cyber threats. Using SMEs, the
cyber insider threat dashboard visualization prototype was developed and validated. The
remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, the research problem was
presented. Followed by the main dissertation goal, research questions, relevance, and
significance. Then, the barriers and issues as well as the definition of terms are presented.
Next, the literature review is presented, followed by the methodology. Next, the results,
conclusions, implications, recommendations, and summary are presented. Lastly, the
appendices are presented.

Problem Statement
The research problem that this study addressed was the prevalent challenge faced
within the cybersecurity industry when detecting potentially malicious insider cyber
threats, to enable visualization of those threats as they occur (Gorg et al., 2013; Inibhunu
et al., 2016; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009; Patcha & Park, 2007). The nature of insider threats
remains unchanged within cybersecurity research, and it remains a complicated threat to
mitigate (Kumarmandal & Chatterjee, 2015). “Employees and contractors are the second
greatest threat to an organization, exceeded only by hackers”, as such employees and
contractors are considered insiders (Greitzer, Moore, Cappelli, Andrews, Carroll, & Hull,
2008, p. 61). A hacker is an unauthorized outsider who initiates a threat or attack (Sun,
Srivastava, & Mock, 2006). An ‘insider’ has legitimate access to an organization
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(Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). ‘Insider threat’ refers to, individuals with legitimate access
whose behaviors put data, intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at
risk of being compromised (Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010; Predd, Pfleeger,
Hunker, & Bulford, 2008). A malicious insider “is an insider who has malicious intent
that acts against the best interests of the organization” (Santos et al., 2012, p. 331).
Malicious insiders within cyberspace are significant challenges that organizations
face (Azaria, Richardson, Kraus, & Subrahmanian, 2014). In 2005, a United States (U.S.)
Justice Department survey found that 74% of all cyber-theft within organizations were
carried out by insiders and 40% of all cyber-incidents reported by 36,000 U.S. businesses
involved insiders (Rantala, 2008). In 2013, there were over 117,000 cyber attacks per day
costing firms over $28 million (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2014). Current insider threat
detection solutions inevitably trigger large volumes of false positive alerts. A false
positive alert is a false alarm triggered when a detected vulnerability does not actually
exist but is counted in a measurement as valid, requiring investigation of the incident and
organizational resources (Mell, Bergeron, & Henning, 2005). According to Victor, Rao,
and Venkaiah (2010), most intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have very high rates of
false positives. This may lead to desensitized analysts ignoring possibly dangerous
exploits that pose potentially detrimental financial and intellectual property damage to
organizations (Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). An intrusion may be caused by “attackers
accessing systems from the Internet or by authorized users of systems that attempt to
misuse the privileges given to them and/or to gain more privileges for which they are not
authorized” (Lazarevic, Kumar, & Srivastava, 2005, p. 21). An IDS, defined as a misuse
or anomaly detector, may be used to detect unauthorized or malicious attacks over a
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system that primarily occurs through the Internet (Kumar & NandaMohan, 2008).
Traditional intrusion detection and prevention systems may be insufficiently
designed -- they may not be capable of promptly identifying malicious insiders cyber
threats or they generate a considerable amount of false positive alerts (Agrafiotis et al.,
2015; Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). Since intrusive activity does not always correlate
with anomalous activity, newly developed insider threat solutions that use the same
techniques as traditional IDSs may not be adequate. Newly developed insider threat
solutions should allow for rapid analysis of complex data correlations relevant to the
identification of potentially malicious cyber insiders (Patcha & Park, 2007). While IDSs
are good at detecting intrusions they do not specialize in anomaly identification
(Gandomi & Haider, 2015). Anomaly detection can be very difficult within large
complex data sets as it may result in spurious correlations or “uncorrelated variables
being falsely found to be correlated due to the massive size of the dataset” (Gandomi &
Haider, 2015, p. 143). An anomaly detection system aids with the identification of
abnormal behaviors based on complex data correlations. In this study a complex data
correlation refers to identifying linear or non-linear relationships between two or more
data variables (Patcha & Park, 2007).
Detecting malicious cyber insider threats is a complex task since their malicious
actions take place along normal activities (Azaria et al., 2014). Identifying anomalous
activities amidst appropriate activities pose the potential difficulty of being able to
identify legitimate anomalies within the data presented. Shneiderman and Plaisant (2015)
referred to this difficulty as the ‘analytic-focusing problem’. Useful visualizations should
sharpen the analytic focus to enable detection of patterns or anomalies of interest
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(Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). Detecting misuse by malicious cyber insiders involves
examining an individual’s use of information and resources to decide whether the use is
legitimate and/or deviates from what is considered ‘normal’ activities (Caputo, Maloof,
& Stephens, 2009). Cyber analysts must find outliers or anomalies (also referred to as
anomalous activities) within all of the users generated activities utilizing data analytics
and information visualization (Kang, Gorg, & Stasko, 2011). Data analytics also uses
data mining of large volumes of records, images, and activities translated to emphasize
areas of interest that aid in understanding complex data (Kang et al., 2011).
Researchers are combining data mining and information-visualization to allow for
visual inspection of data examination of outlier data (Shneiderman, Plaisant, Cohen, &
Jacobs, 2010, p. 556). Information visualization is “communicating and perceiving data,
both abstract and scientific, through visual representations” (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 27).
Visual analytics supports human decision-making in complex application domains
(Arias-Hernández, Dill, Fisher, & Green, 2011). For instance, visual analytics is used in
medicine for anomaly detection within patients’ vital signs (Dutta, Maeder, & Basilakis,
2013). There are challenges faced with “archival, retrieval, and transformation” of the
data when deciphering data analytics logs (Levy & Ramim, 2012, p. 99). Misspelled,
duplicated, or data written in foreign languages may enhance the difficulty of misuse
detection within an abundance of data (Jonas, 2006). Imbalanced data also often results in
very high accuracy for the majority class (benign users), and very low accuracy for the
minority class (malicious insiders). Identifying anomalies while taking corrective action
accordingly poses a challenge (Azaria et al., 2014).
Cyber analysts have to prioritize triggered alerts related to data moved over the
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Internet and account for relevant cyber attacks. Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) tools are applications that offer the ability to gather security data
from information system components and present that data as actionable information via
a single interface. SIEM tools are used by many cyber analysts within large organizations
(NIST, 2013). Development techniques for visualization systems in the context of
cybersecurity tools should be evaluated since increased data is driving endless alerts most
are falsely noted and increasing the response time required for decision-making (AriasHernández et al., 2011). In a case study performed by ACI Payment Systems (2015),
when the Canadian Federal Government enforced stricter anti-money laundering
regulations. By applying enhanced profiling tables and alert rules to an existing risk
management solution reduced debit card fraud alerts by 84% and reduced analyst
resources by 50%. These findings indicate an enhancement of profiling tables produced
less work for analysts while increasing detection rates. There is a lack of effective
methods for analysts to investigate events generated from big data infrastructure
equipment and to find the correct diagnosis of critical alert information from the
excessive alerts (Boukri & Chaoui, 2015).
Prior research that examined detection of malicious insider cyber threats has
mainly been focused on anomaly detection methods, malicious behaviors, or detection
techniques used by cyber analysts (Agrafiotis et al., 2015; Azaria et al., 2014; Legg et al.,
2015; Santos et al., 2012). Kemmerer and Vigna (2002) defined anomaly detection as,
“models of the intended users and applications behaviors, which interpret deviations from
normal behavior as a problem” (p. 28). According to Legg et al. (2015), cyber analysts
can be empowered to identify anomalous activities by combining detection results with a
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visual analytics approach for expedited real-time detection. Arias-Hernández et al. (2011)
concluded that visual analytics challenges would require coordination of Human
Computer Interaction (HCI) practitioners as well as visualization and computation
researchers. Boukri and Chaoui (2015) also conferred that dashboard-based visualization
techniques could be used to provide full visibility of network progress and problems in
real-time. Heckman, Stech, Schmoker, and Thomas (2015) speculated that conventional
approaches to cybersecurity are inadequate since conventional approaches that may
include applying firewalls and IDS technologies are still being penetrated allowing
sensitive information to be exploited. Accordingly, there is an evident need for an
unconventional approach to address cybersecurity challenges when detecting cyber
insider threats. This study approached the challenge of detecting cyber insider threats in
an unconventional way by utilizing a newly developed visualization prototype to enhance
the presentation of complex malicious insider cyber threat, both linear and non-linear,
indicator correlations.
In the field of medicine, practitioners understand the importance of monitoring as
well as recording patients’ vital signs (Mok, Wang, & Liaw, 2015). In most cases just
four vital signs serve as an essential tool for determining life saving responses (Harries,
Zachariah, Kapur, Jahn, & Enarson, 2009). Within business organizations, Executive
Dashboards (EDs) are used to present real-time information pertinent to the organizations
strategy and risks because EDs are designed to enable efficient decision-making (Ballou,
Heitger, & Donnell, 2010). Within the Department of Defense (DoD) the Under
Secretary of Defense Comptroller’s office implemented EDs for presenting credible and
timely data where only core data with concise tables are presented to analysts (Dees,
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2009). Similarly, the Heads Up Display (HUD) considerably altered cockpit information
for pilots. Using cross-monitoring principles a pilot continually references external visual
cues, correlations of pitch, attitude, and vertical speed to make decisions in the event of
unwarranted deviations (Dopping-Hepenstal, 1981). This is pertinent to highlighting how
visualizations are already being used within these well-established industries.
Practitioners are making critical decisions daily using visualizations and EDs.
Shneiderman et al. (2010) indicated, “new visualization products should be more than
just cool, they should offer measurable benefits for realistic tasks” (p. 539). There is an
apparent need to identify and validate requirements and define visualization techniques
for the development of a cyber insider threat visualization prototype (Legg et al., 2015;
Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). As EDs, HUDs, and vital signs have enhanced their
industries, the cyber insider threat visualization prototype developed in this study
similarly aims to enhance the visualizations presented in the cybersecurity industry.

Dissertation Goal
The main goal of this study was to develop and validate, using Subject Matter
Experts (SMEs), a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization prototype. The prototype
used in an experimental study that aimed to assess the perceived effectiveness of
enhancing the presentation of complex data correlations when mitigating malicious
insiders cyber threats. The need for this work is demonstrated by the research of
Albanese, Pugliese, and Subrahmanian (2013), Boukri and Chaoui (2015), Dork et al.
(2011), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), Legg et al. (2015), Shneiderman et al. (2010), as
well as Shneiderman and Plaisant (2015). Albanese et al. (2013) developed a graphical
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index that would aid in providing evidence of occurrences of an activity, and identify if
an anomaly matches a sequence of observations in a simulated environment. Dork et al.
(2011) approached the challenge of complex data visualization by presenting a novel
visualization technique combining implicit and explicit data relationships and still finding
that more work is necessary to understand complex information spaces. Though the threat
posed by malicious cyber insiders is real, there is a lack of precise analysis due to the
sheer volume of activities (Legg et al., 2015; Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010).
Prior research that has developed dashboard visualization prototypes rarely
addressed the perceived effectiveness using multiple SMEs within the applicable field
(Goodall, 2007). Without a deeper understanding of the cyber analyst using the
visualization, progress and practical application was difficult (Gorg et al., 2013).
Assessing the perceived effectiveness of the developed cyber insider threat dashboard
visualization prototype enhanced the validity for this research (Petter, Delone, &
McLean, 2013). The perceived effectiveness was determined by obtaining a rating for
satisfaction and value of the developed prototype (Hong, Tai, Hwang, Kuo, & Chen,
2017; Levy, 2006; Ellis & Levy, 2009). Identifying and assessing the risk score was
beyond the scope of this study. Risk calculation are addressed in the AI-InCyThR™
prototype (Hueca, Clarke, & Levy, 2016). Once the prototype was developed,
cybersecurity analysts were asked to assess the perceived effectiveness based on their
user experience. The goal of the developed prototype is to alleviate the issues faced when
using visualizations to identify potentially malicious cyber insiders.
There are multiple issues that reside with IDSs, for instance, triggering alarms
where over 90% of the alerts are false positives, while identifying the true positive alerts
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can be error prone and labor intensive (Ho, Lai, Chen, Wang, & Tai, 2012). This makes it
difficult for cyber analysts to identify alerts that are legitimate, important, and procure the
appropriate response (Julisch, 2003). Another issue faced is identifying anomalies within
the environment (Patcha & Park, 2007). Visualizing the data can aid in presenting strong
connections between individuals and entities, as was utilized to explore the Commission
Report about the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (Gorg et al., 2013). Applying
visualizations may assist with the issues encountered with current IDSs. “Visualizations
use enormous visual bandwidth and a remarkable human perceptual system to enable
users to make discoveries, decisions, or propose explanations” (Shneiderman et al., 2010,
p. 538). Legg et al. (2013) developed a conceptual model for insider threat that would
give an all-encompassing organizational view. Applying the proper visualizations within
cybersecurity may aid management decision-making efforts. It appears there is a need for
a visualization prototype that presents actionable alerts to cyber analysts.
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) found that in a substantial number of cases, prior to
an exploit, the malicious intent of the insider was ‘observable’. Legg et al. (2015) later
suggested that visualizations enabled cyber analysts to identify what particular attributes
caused the insider to be detected, and coupling the detection results with visual analytics
enhanced detection of anomalous activities. Pfleeger et al. (2010) concluded that by using
four basic dimensions of the insider threat (the organization, the system, the individual,
and the environment) insider actions could be evaluated to frame responses. In Figure 1,
these four basic dimensions are used to frame the Quality User Insider ChecKing
visualization (QUICK.v™) interface that presented identified vital signs pertinent to the
identification of malicious cyber insiders. Applying the concept of four essential vital
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signs from the medical field, the primary visualization technique for each identified cyber
vital sign was selected and applied to QUICK.v™. Based on Shneiderman (1996)’s
visualization mantra: overview, zoom and filter, then details on demand. Figure 2
presents a Sankey visualization that allows for zoom, filter of generated details, and may
also allow analysts access to complete details on demand. Shneiderman et al. (2010)
noted that new visualization products should “present information more rapidly and allow
user-controlled exploration”, without overwhelming novice users (p. 558). This study
builds on earlier research by Boukri and Chaoui (2015), as well as Pfleeger et al. (2010)
by developing and testing a visual analytics prototype that aims to decrease the time it
takes to react to potentially malicious cyber activities.
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Figure 1: Quality User Insider ChecKing visualization
(QUICK.v™) interface Dashboard
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Figure 2: QUICK.v™ Interface Detailed Analysis

This study had five specific goals. The first research goal was to identify, using
SMEs, the critical cyber visualization variables (see Appendix A). The cyber
visualization variables refer to analytic variables that may aid in identifying potentially
malicious cyber insiders (Casey, 2015). The second research goal was to identify, using
SMEs, the rank order of the critical cyber visualization variables that the developed
prototype should include, which may aid in identifying potentially malicious cyber
insiders. The third research goal was to identify, using SMEs, the most valid presentation
of complex data correlations using the identified critical visualization variables over
multiple visualization techniques. The fourth research goal was to apply SMEs’ identified
critical visualization variables, in rank order, and techniques to develop QUICK.v™. The
fifth research goal was to conduct an experimental study using SMEs to assess the
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perceived effectiveness using self-reported value and satisfaction of the QUICK.v™
prototype when mitigating malicious cyber insiders.

Research Questions
In the medical field, vital signs are the core component of clinical management,
aiding healthcare professionals with identifying potential threats to the normal operations
of the body (Harries et al., 2009). Tracking insiders within cyber and the ability to
analyze normal insider activities or when insiders are posing a threat appears to be much
needed (Legg et al., 2015). It is pertinent to identify changes in vital signs early as this
may prevent patient deterioration (Mok et al., 2015). Likewise, identifying malicious
cyber insiders early may prevent an organization from financial decline. The overarching
research question that this study addressed is: What visualization variables and
techniques should be used to develop a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization
prototype that enhances the effective presentation of complex data correlations within
cybersecurity? There is an abundance of visualization techniques available: graph-based,
hierarchical, pixel-oriented, icon-based, geometric, etc. (Keim, 2000). Using the most
effective visualization technique is vital for enhancing cyber insider threat analysis. The
specific research questions that this study addressed are:
RQ1: What are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider
cyber threats?
RQ2: What is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat
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dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber
insider activities?
RQ3: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical
cyber visualization variables that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
RQ4: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious
cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
RQ5: What is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction &
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially
malicious cyber insider threats?
Utilizing a cyber visualization prototype like QUICK.v™ may allow cyber analysts to
detect malicious insider threats more efficiently, while allowing cyber leaders to take
effective corrective actions. By reducing the key indicators of malicious activities to be
displayed specifically for cyber analysts, QUICK.v™ may enable early detection and
prevention of malicious cyber insider threats. Therefore, a real-time overall view of the
cyber environment using appropriate visualization techniques aided in addressing visual
analytic challenges faced by cyber analysts (Boukri & Chaoui, 2015).
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Relevance and Significance
Relevance
This study presents a novel way of addressing the prevailing problem faced when
detecting malicious cyber insiders. Past studies have aimed at addressing this challenge,
however, the problem persists. Randazzo, Keeney, and Kowalski (2005) detailed
numerous insider attacks from 1996 to 2002, with losses to individual firms ranging from
$200 thousand to $600 million. According to Pfleeger et al. (2010), “insider misuse can
threaten personal data, national security, as well as economic prosperity” (p. 169).
Recently, this challenge has still continued to persist. Price WaterHouse Coopers (PwC)
identified that insiders are likely to be to the primary source of cyber attacks (PwC,
2013). In 2014, a significant percentage of U.S. executives worried that cyber threat
would impact growth within their organizations (PwC, 2014). Approaching this problem
from an alternate perspective with a novel development can aid in addressing this
problem. Cole (2015) conducted a survey on 772 individuals based on the results, 34% of
respondents estimated over $1 million was lost due to insider attacks. Therefore,
identifying potential mitigations for malicious cyber insider threats is pertinent to
preventing detrimental financial and intellectual property damage to organizations. By
applying a novel approach to solving this problem, new insight into enhancing
mitigations by utilizing appropriate visualization techniques may be applied in order to
detect malicious cyber insiders.
Significance
This study assisted in the identification of malicious insiders (Agrafiotis et al.,
2015; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009). This was done by obtaining user requirements from
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current cyber SMEs, applying the requirements to the development of a dashboard
visualization prototype, and iterating the design, using SMEs to determine the perceived
effectiveness of the developed prototype. Similar to cyber analysts, nurses perform
surveillance to identify changes in activity and protect patients from harm (Rogers, Dean,
Hwang, & Scott, 2008). Additionally, communication delays of vital signs may result in
patient deterioration (DeVita, 2005). Within cybersecurity mitigating adverse incidents
require surveillance to identify anomaly metrics and attack patterns (Agrafiotis et al.,
2015). Delays in identifying a potentially malicious cyber insider may result in
substantial losses, resulting in the deterioration of an organization (Randazzo et al.,
2005). Developing dashboard visualizations similar to those used by nurses when making
critical decisions, but tailored toward cyber vitals incorporates a novel approach to
anomaly detection within cybersecurity. Therefore, to develop a cyber dashboard
prototype for the detection of malicious cyber insiders, input was obtained from cyber
SMEs with the knowledge and experience to identify effective indicators, data points, and
fluctuations allowing for the development of a more relevant and valid prototype. This
study is substantially significant since there are substantial financial losses resulting from
exploits perpetrated as a result of malicious cyber insiders.

Barriers and Issues
A barrier was collecting results from the SMEs over multiple iterations, to obtain
the pertinent cyber variables and then to validate the developed prototype. As a result,
participants were rewarded with a gift card for participation. Another barrier of this study
was that after administering the Delphi technique within the second phase, an experiment
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then needed to be conducted applying the developed prototype for SME assessment.
Since the participants were all volunteers, they could have withdrawn from the study at
any time skewing the final results (Ellis & Levy, 2009). By rewarding participants for
their time this reduced the rate of withdrawal. Additionally, variations in the SMEs years
of experience may alter the informality of their results, as some SMEs may be more
experienced than others. As such some SMEs may be more familiar with the
requirements necessary for the adequate detection and remediation of cyber insider
threats than others. To ensure all SMEs had a baseline understanding of insider threats,
prior to conducting the survey, all SMEs were informed of what insider threat means
within the scope of this study, as well as identified variables for anomaly identification
within cybersecurity, and significant benefits of mitigating malicious cyber insider
threats.

Limitation and Delimitation
Limitation
A limitation of this study was that the developed visualization prototype intended
to visualize complex correlations based on cybersecurity related data. The cybersecurity
data needed to be fed to the developed visualization prototype from viable data sources.
The parsed data feeds were then utilized for generating the visualizations on the validated
front-end. If the data input “was either incorrect, of low quality, or irrelevant, the resulted
output was going to be ineffective regardless of the quality of the processing,
colloquially, garbage-in/garbage-out” (Levy & Ellis, 2006, p. 185). If the data source was
corrupted or incorrect the visualizations presented would be inaccurate. The findings of
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this study served as the foundation of what needs to be presented within current
cybersecurity visualizations. The prototype developed served as a tool for simplifying
current visualization techniques and presenting the generated events. However, as the
source of the data feeds change overtime the visualization variables used to develop the
prototype may need additional validation. The prototype being developed would
represent variables relevant to current applications and data sources. Therefore, future
research may be required to apply the prototype that was developed using SMEs to future
data sources.
Delimitation
A potential delimitation of this study was that the developed prototype did not
perform data parsing the developed prototype visualized already parsed data in a
consumable form factor pertinent to cyber professionals. Additionally, this study was
limited to participants who have worked or are working within cybersecurity.

Definition of Terms
The following represent terms and definitions.
Anomaly Detection – “Models of the intended users and applications behaviors that
interpret deviations from normal behavior as a problem” (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002, p.
28).
Cyber Attack – “An attack, via cyberspace, that targets an enterprise’s use of cyberspace
for the purpose of disrupting, destroying, or maliciously controlling a computer
environment/infrastructure; destroying the integrity of the data; or stealing controlled
information” (NIST, 2013, p. 57).
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Cyber Crime – “Any crime that involves computers and networks, including crimes that
do not rely heavily on computers” (Casey, 2000, p. 8).
Cybersecurity – “Prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if
needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Axelrod, 2006, p. 1).
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers in critical industries (The White House, 2009).
Cyberterrorism – “Concerted, sophisticated attacks on networks” (as cited in Foltz,
2004, p. 154).
Data - A subset of information in an electronic format that allows it to be retrieved or
transmitted (NIST, 2013, p. 58).
Data Analytics – The use of data mining of large volumes of records, images, and
activities translated to highlight areas of interest to aid in understanding complex data
(Leventhal, 2010).
Data Breach - An organization’s unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or
loss of sensitive PI, such as social security numbers; financial information, such as credit
card numbers; date of birth; or mother’s maiden name (NIST, 2010).
False-positive Alerts – “When something (e.g., a vulnerability) does not actually exist
but is counted in a measurement” (Mell, Bergeron, & Henning, 2005, p. 40).
Information System (IS) – The system that governs the information technology
development, use, application, and influence on a business or corporation (Alvarez,
2002).
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Information Visualization – “Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and
scientific, through visual representations” (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 27).
Insider – “Individuals who have legitimate access to an organization” (Pfleeger, Predd,
Hunker, & Bulford, 2010, p. 169).
Insider Attack - The abuse of privileges or access by an insider that results in a breach,
interruption or disregard of a law, rule, or policy (Goodall, 2007).
Insider Threat – “Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data,
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked”
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010, p. 169).
Intrusion Detection System – “Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse” (NIST, 2013, p.104).
Intrusion Prevention System – “Systems that can detect and attempt to stop an intrusive
activity, ideally before it reaches its target” (NIST, 2013, p. 105).
Malicious Insider – “Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best
interests of the organization” (Santos et al., 2012, p. 331).
Security Event – “Any observable security occurrence in a system network” (NIST,
2012, p. 6).
Security Incident – “A violation or imminent threat of violation of a computer security
policy, acceptable use policy, or standard security practice” (NIST, 2012, p. 6).
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Tool – “Application that
provides the ability to gather security data from information system components and
present that data as actionable information via a single interface” (NIST, 2013, p. 177).
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Threat – “Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact
organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation),
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an
information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of
information, and/or denial of service (NIST, 2013, p. 198).

Summary
The purpose of chapter one was to introduce this study by identifying the research
problem, questions, barriers, issues, and limitations. In the next chapter, a comprehensive
review of literature is presented. The research problem of the study was the prevalent
challenge faced within the cybersecurity industry when detecting potentially malicious
insider cyber threats, to enable visualization of those threats as they occur. Literature
reviews to support the stated research problem and need for this study are detailed within
the next chapter.
Chapter one also presented the research goals and research questions. The main
goal of this study was to develop and validate, using SMEs, a cyber insider threat
dashboard visualization prototype. The prototype was used in an experimental study that
aimed to assess the perceived effectiveness of enhancing the presentation of complex data
correlations when mitigating malicious insiders cyber threats. Literature to support this
goal was presented (Albanese, Pugliese, & Subrahmanian, 2013); Boukri & Chaoui,
2015); Dork et al., 2011); Greitzer & Hohimer, 2011); Legg et al., 2015); Shneiderman et
al., 2010); as well as Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). The five specific goals of this study
were also discussed. Based on prior literature intrusion detection and prevention systems
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may be insufficiently designed so they may not be capable of identifying malicious
insiders cyber threats (Agrafiotis et al., 2015; Spathoulas & Katsikas, 2010). Identifying
anomalous activities amidst appropriate activities pose the potential difficulty of being
able to identify legitimate anomalies within the data presented by Shneiderman and
Plaisant (2015). This study added to the body of knowledge by applying a novel approach
to insider threat identification, new insight into enhancing mitigations by utilizing
appropriate visualization techniques may be applied in order to detect malicious cyber
insiders.
Lastly, chapter one continued by discussing the barriers, issues and potential
mitigations for each. The limitations and delimitations of this study were also discussed
within the presented barriers and issues section. The chapter concluded with a list of
definitions of terms that was used throughout this study and any applicable acronyms.
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Chapter 2
Review of Literature
Introduction
A literature review is presented in this chapter to provide an analysis of the
relevant literature pertaining to insider threat detection and visualization. According to
Webster and Watson (2002), an effective literature review is essential to creating a firm
foundation for advancing knowledge, since it facilitates theory development and
uncovers areas needing additional work. A literature review should also be objective and
gather information on a particular subject from many sources, in order to support the
newly contributed insight (Ramdhani, Ramdhani, & Amin, 2014). Thus, the presented
literature review within this chapter displayed objective information gathering in relation
to the need for this work. This examination consists of an extensive search performed
within IS, InfoSec, HCI and medical literature. Quality literature reviews have structure,
form, and is structured around major themes or concepts that emerge as the author
examines and reviews the literature (Levy & Ellis, 2006). As a result of the literature
review performed, constructs relevant to the visualization of insider threats for
identifying anomalous activities of malicious cyber insiders were identified as:
cybersecurity, cyber analysts, intrusion detection, insider threat analytic variables,
information visualization and IS effectiveness. An extensive review of these constructs
was preformed to determine established knowledge within these identified areas needing
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additional investigation. The results of this literature review relevant to these constructs
are later presented.

Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is defined as “prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of,
exploitation of, and, if needed, the restoration of electronic information and
communications systems to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability” (Axelrod,
2006). It is commonly used to refer to the protection of devices connected to the Internet
(Addae, Radenkovic, Sun, & Towey, 2016). The term ‘cybersecurity’ is often used
interchangeably with the term information systems security, though these terms greatly
differ (Solms & Niekerk, 2013). Cybersecurity is not just the protection of cyberspace; it
is also the protection of those who function in cyberspace and any of their assets that can
be reached via cyberspace (Thomson & Solms, 2005).
Cybersecurity is about the protection of the assets and people using resources in
cyberspace and any other assets these assets may be tangible or intangible and including
those belonging to society in general (Solms & Niekerk, 2013). Cybersecurity issues are
different from any issues faced before (Harknett & Stever, 2011). Cybersecurity issues
involve human intelligence and the exploits or vulnerabilities are created to defy and
change the rules of the systems they target (Toecker, 2014). Problems within
cybersecurity do not fit the traditional security variables, since problems within
cybersecurity tend to also be a strategic issue and not just a compliance issue (Bissell,
2013). There is also a profuse amount of non-geographical data and an additional layer of
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territorial division of responsibilities that adds to the difficulties of mitigating cyber
insider threats (Harknett & Stever, 2011).
Cybersecurity problems became prominent following the attacks on September
11, 2001, after which President Bush created the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(Harknett & Stever, 2011). The Bush Administration unveiled the National Strategy for
Securing Cyberspace (NSSC) in 2003, a prominent effort to address the nation’s
cybersecurity problems (Harknett & Stever, 2011). Cybersecurity issues persisted into
2009 and President Obama declared cybersecurity defense as a significant national
security interest that the U.S. government was not adequately prepared to counter
(Sherman, 2013). To understand cybersecurity it is important to also understand
cyberspace.
Cyberspace consists of a growing number of connected computers, with a global
community of individual users, and a constantly evolving set of technologies.
Cybersecurity professionals actively work towards ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and
availability for computers within this space (Miller & Murphy, 2009). With increased
reliance on cyberspace, vulnerabilities have also grown (Warkentin & Willison, 2009).
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) noted that cybersecurity issues are contingent upon
securing cyberspace, and this issue is comparable to environmental and health issues. A
defining characteristic of cybersecurity is that all assets may contain data that needs to be
protected, since the vulnerabilities that exist are a result of information and
communication technologies, all of which make up cyberspace (Solms & Niekerk, 2013).
Caputo et al. (2009) concluded they were unable to determine a specific technique for
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determining insider misuse, but by providing a common operational overview of
cyberspace they have provided valuable insights for mitigating cybersecurity problems.
Table 1
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Addae,
Radenkovic,
Sun, &
Towey, 2016

Empirical
study via
survey

174 online
participants

Anderson &
Agarwal,
2010

Empirical
study via
survey

594 home
computer
users

Axelrod, 2006

Literature
review and
analysis

Instrument or
Construct
Survey using a
five-point
Likert scale

Main Finding or
Contribution
Augmented
behavioral research
model that
introduces attitude
to personal data as a
determinant of
cybersecurity
behavior.

Survey and
experiment
using a sevenpoint Likert
scale

Behavioral
intentions to
secure one’s own
computer and to
secure the Internet
is formed by a
combination of
cognitive, social,
and psychological
components.

IT process and
control
requirements

Enterprises must
take on
responsibility for
protection within
their perimeters.
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Table 1
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Bissell, 2013

Literature
review and
synthesis

Caputo et al.,
2009

Empirical
study via
experiment

Harknett &
Stever, 2011

Policy review
and analysis

Instrument or
Construct
Cyberattacks,
cyberinsurace

Main Finding or
Contribution
The development of
a cybersecurity
roadmap enabled
organizations to
develop a much
clearer picture of its
current status and
gain a better
understanding
of its strengths and
gaps.

50 employees
at MITRE
(Management,
technical, and
administrative
staff)

A study laptop
running
software
that monitored
their
informationuse behavior

There isn’t one
behavior that
distinguishes
malicious users
from benign ones.
The most
valuable way to
tackle insider
threats is to
cast a wide net and
strategically
evaluate behaviors
to identify misuse.

U.S.
government
cybersecurity
policy
releases from
2002 to 2011

Cybersecurity
policy

Based on the
national strategy for
securing cyberspace
the
Goal of securing
cyberspace was
occasionally
achieved in
moderate technical,
tactical,
and operational
advances.

Sample
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Table 1
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Miller &
Murphy, 2009

Theoretical

Sherman,
2013

Literature
review and
analysis

Solms &
Niekerk, 2013

Literature
review and
Synthesis

Sample

58 U.S.
government
releases on
cybersecurity

Instrument or
Construct
Cybersecurity
review and
problems

Main Finding or
Contribution
The cybersecurity
problem required
new models of
cooperation
and collaboration
among
nations.

Cybersecurity
defense,
cybersecurity
strategy

Senior
policymakers must
commit the
resources to build
and nurture a highly
skilled cyber
workforce capable
of overcoming
cyber threats and
vulnerabilities.

Cybersecurity
and
information
security

Cybersecurity,
differs from
information
security;
cybersecurity is not
only the protection
of cyberspace itself,
but also
the protection of
those that function
in cyberspace and
any of their assets.
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Table 1
Summary of Cybersecurity Literature (continued)
Instrument or
Construct
Information
security
obedience,
corporate
governance,
information
security,
corporate
culture

Main Finding or
Contribution
Information
Security Obedience
is the solution to
ensuring proper
information security
behavior.

Theoretical

security
control
systems

Recommendations
to provide efficient
risk reduction
from cybersecurity
events, answering
the question
"Where should I put
my next dollar
in order to get the
biggest
cybersecurity
improvement?"

Literature
review and
synthesis

Insider threat

There is a need to
understand
and address the
various risks to the
security of the IS on
which we depend.

Study

Methodology

Thomson &
Solms, 2005

Literature
review and
synthesis

Toecker, 2014

Warkentin &
Willison,
2009

Sample

Cyber Analysts
Organizations rely on skilled analysts to make critical decisions pertaining to:
threats, vulnerabilities, and network performance (Staheli, Yu, Crouser, Damodaran,
Nam, O’Gwynn, McKenna, & Harrison, 2014). Cyber analysts examine people within
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organizations, internal, external incidents, within varying applications, locations, and
dates to uncover potentially imminent threats (Gorg et al., 2013). They have the unsavory
job of analyzing a profuse amount of alerts whose performance characteristics are often
either unknown or uncertain (Walton, Maguire, & Chen, 2015). Analysts struggle with
processing large volumes of data and providing valuable insights (Shneiderman &
Plaisant, 2015). In many cases the overwhelming amount of data leaves cyber analysts
unable to formulate effective remediation plans (Arias-Hernández et al., 2011). Caputo et
al. (2009) found that two cyber analysts could effectively review 23 users per day using a
developed insider threat detection system. However, they still struggled to develop a
technique which aided in efficient identifying, with significant reduction in false
positives, of malicious insiders.
Visualizations benefit cyber analysts attempting to identify complex problems.
Visualizations help cyber analysts to both identify problems, potentially malicious
insiders, and to work visually towards finding solutions (Fink, North, Endert, & Rose,
2009). Goodall (2007) evaluated user performance when using a traditional application
versus one that utilizes visualizations for network packet analysis and found that users
discovered more insights when utilizing a visualization tool. Visualizing complex issues
using simple and intuitive methods so patterns can be quickly recognized assisted in
overcoming cybersecurity problems (Choi, Lee, & Kim, 2009). Though Goodall (2007)
found visualizations to be beneficial, his study focused only on network analysts and
suggested the methods be applied using cybersecurity applications.
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Table 2
Summary of Cyber Analysts Literature
Instrument or
Construct
Cognitive
science, visual
analytics, HCI

Main Finding or
Contribution
For analysts to
overcome visual
analytics challenges
it would be best
achieved with the
active involvement
of HCI researchers
and practitioners.

50 employees
holding
various
positions at
MITRE
(Management,
technical, and
administrative
staff)

Study laptop
running
software
that monitored
informationuser behavior

There isn’t one
behavior that
distinguishes
malicious users
from benign ones.
The most valuable
way to tackle
insider threats is to
cast a wide net and
strategically
evaluate behaviors
to identify misuse.

Empirical
study via
experiment

A real-life
Internet attack
traffic trace
(Network
packets)

Traffic flow
generator

The development of
parallel coordinate
attack visualization
(PCAV) is a realtime visualization
system for detecting
anomalies
from Internet
attacks.

Empirical
study via
experiment

8 cyber
analysts at a
laboratory

Visualization

Designed usable
workspaces
for cyber analysts.

Study

Methodology

AriasHernández et
al., 2011

Theoretical

Caputo et al.,
2009

Empirical
study via
experiment

Choi, Lee, &
Kim, 2009

Fink, North,
Endert, &
Rose, 2009

Sample
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Table 2
Summary of Cyber Analysts Literature (continued)
Sample

Instrument or
Construct
Visualization

Main Finding or
Contribution
Examination of
VizSec literature
attempting to solve
the problems of
computer security
through enabling
humans through
information
visualization.

Study

Methodology

Goodall, 2007

Literature
review and
synthesis

Gorg et al.,
2013

Empirical
study via
experiment

5 Student
Visual
teams at
analytics
Mercyhurst
College for 10
weeks

Visual analytics
succeeds only if
developers
fully understand the
unique demands of
analysis and
the way that
analysts approach
their work.

Shneiderman
& Plaisant,
2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

Analyticfocusing

Identification of 10
analytic focusing
strategies to sharpen
analytic processes
and enable users to
deal with larger
datasets.

Staheli, Yu,
Crouser,
Damodaran,
Nam,
O’Gwynn,
McKenna, &
Harrison,
2014

Empirical
study via
secondary
data and
survey

Visualization

Identified existing
methodological
gaps in evaluating
visualization in
cyber security, and
suggested
potential avenues
for future research.

Surveyed 130
papers from
the past 10
years of
VizSec
proceedings
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Table 2
Summary of Cyber Analysts Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Walton,
Maguire, &
Chen, 2015

Empirical
study via case
study

Selection of
visualizations
from the
system,
CITD
(Corporate
Insider Threat
Detection)
Dashboard

Instrument or
Construct
Dashboard
Visualization

Main Finding or
Contribution
Introduced a visual
analytics loop for
protective
monitoring in
cybersecurity
applications, and a
prototype tool
demonstrating an
example
implementation of
the approach.

Intrusion and Anomaly Detection
Intrusion detection systems are the equivalent of burglar alarms within
cybersecurity and anomaly detection systems are a subset of IDSs that specialize in
discovering unknown attacks (Patcha & Park, 2007). Although anomaly detection
stemmed from IDSs, the goal of an anomaly detection system is to detect new or
unknown attacks (Yu, 2012). Anomaly detection relies on identifying normal activities
and reporting against deviations from identified normal activities (Cao, Li, Coleman,
Belatreche, & McGinnity, 2015). Anomaly detection is based on event correlation
techniques that can be categorized and utilized to infer threats through correlation
analysis (Ten, 2010). Common types of IDSs are signature based or anomaly based (Ye,
Emran, Chen, & Vilbert, 2002). Commonly used IDSs are often signature based and
require constant updates of rules and known attacks to stay effective (Patcha & Park,
2007). Signature based detection is reactive and with today’s advanced threats they are
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seemingly outdated (Jackson, 2012). Signature based anomaly detection uses intrusion
signatures that have to be manually added as profiles of intrusion characteristics, if an
intrusion signature is present then and intrusion alert is triggered (Ye et al., 2002).
Anomalies are patterns of interest that do not conform to normal behaviors
detection techniques use identified data to develop a baseline of normal activities
(Chouhan & Richhariya, 2015). Some anomaly detection approaches use the
identification of a score, to indicate “the degree of irregularity of a specific event”, when
activities result in a score that exceeds the established baseline of normal activity, then
the occurrence was flagged as an anomaly (Garcia-Teodoro, Diaz-Verdejo, MaciáFernández, & Vázquez, 2009, p. 20). Unknown attacks are detected by creating a baseline
of ‘normal’ activities and if any activities deviate from the baseline then it is identified as
anomalous and potentially malicious activity (Patcha & Park, 2007). Thus, activities that
exceed the baseline as well as activities that are significantly below the baseline can
initiate further investigations by cyber analysts. The baseline running an average for each
pertinent variable, if the data sets activities are above average it was deemed above the
baseline and vice versa. The baseline may be organizational-dependent and could rely
upon factors like the number of employees, type of data being collected, number of data
sources, etc. (Legg et al., 2015). Like organizations, individuals may be drastically
different, however, there are established ‘normal’ baselines for each vital sign in relation
to an individual infant or adult. For instance, the vitals of a healthy adult are depicted
using an Electrocardiogram (EKG) view figure 3, presenting a standard set of vital signs:
“blood pressure: 90/60 mm/Hg to 120/80 mm/Hg, respiratory rate: 12–20 breaths per
minute, pulse rate: 60–100 beats per minute, and temperature: 36°C–37.4°C” (Mok et al.,
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2015, p. 98). Hence, comparable cybersecurity vital signs may be established.

Figure 3: Standard EKG Monitor
Table 3
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Cao, Li,
Coleman,
Belatreche, &
McGinnity,
2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

Real market
data of seven
representative
stocks:
Google,
Microsoft,
Intel, Apple
ARM,
BARCLAYS,
and Vodafone

Instrument or
Construct
Detection
algorithm,
adaptive
hidden Markov
model with
anomaly states
(HMMAS)

Main Finding or
Contribution
AHMMAS
performs better in
terms of the area
under ROC curve
and the F-measure,
respectively.
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Table 3
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Chouhan &
Richhariya,
2015

Literature
review and
analysis

GarciaTeodoro,
Diaz-Verdejo,
MaciáFernández, &
Vázquez,
2009

Literature
review and
analysis

Legg et al.,
2015

Empirical
Investigation
via experiment

Mok et al.,
2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

Instrument or
Construct
Anomaly
detection
algorithm

Main Finding or
Contribution
Summarized
anomaly detection
techniques along
with various
research directions.

Anomalybased
network
intrusion
detection
systems (ANIDS)

Faster and
more effective
countermeasures
are needed to cope
with the
ever-growing
number of detected
attacks.

Ten scenarios
within a
prototype
system

Anomaly
detection

An approach for
insider threat
detection based on
organizational log
data, the
system generates
user and role-based
profiles that can
describe
the full extent of
activities that users
perform within
the organization.

A publication
search
between 1990
to November
2012

Vital Signs

Observation chart
designs together
with
proper training can
most likely improve
the detection of
deteriorating vital
signs.

Sample
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Table 3
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Chouhan &
Richhariya,
2015

Literature
review and
analysis

GarciaTeodoro,
Diaz-Verdejo,
MaciáFernández, &
Vázquez,
2009

Literature
review and
analysis

Legg et al.,
2015

Empirical
Investigation
via experiment

Mok et al.,
2015

Literature
review and
synthesis

Instrument or
Construct
Anomaly
detection
algorithm

Main Finding or
Contribution
Summarized
anomaly detection
techniques along
with various
research directions.

Anomalybased
network
intrusion
detection
systems (ANIDS)

Faster and
more effective
countermeasures
are needed to cope
with the
ever-growing
number of detected
attacks.

Ten scenarios
within a
prototype
system

Anomaly
detection

An approach for
insider threat
detection based on
organizational log
data, the
system generates
user and role-based
profiles that can
describe
the full extent of
activities that users
perform within
the organization.

A publication
search
between 1990
to November
2012

Vital Signs

Observation chart
designs together
with
proper training can
most likely improve
the detection of
deteriorating vital
signs.

Sample
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Table 3
Summary of Intrusion and Anomaly Detection Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Ye, Emran,
Chen, &
Vilbert, 2002

Literature
review and
synthesis

Yu, 2012

Literature
review and
synthesis

Sample

Instrument or
Construct
Intrusion
detection

Main Finding or
Contribution
Since intrusions
may manifest more
through mean shifts
than through
counter
relationships, we
can suppress noises
and variations in
normal activities
causing counter
relationships to
improve the
accuracy of
intrusion detection.

Intrusion
detection

The evolution of
intrusion detection
systems over the
past two decades.

Anomaly Detection Techniques
The most important step for anomaly detection is based on the delineated data
sources profiling the system and user activities. A series of mathematical inputs and
outputs are utilized as predictive methods when detecting anomalies (Patan, 2015). The
method for anomaly detection may vary based on the data source input. Data sources can
include shell commands, system events, audit events, user keystrokes, and packages that
traverse the network (Jyothsna, Prasad, & Prasad, 2011). Data is collected continuously
and may be from several heterogeneous data sources (Chandola, Banerjee, & Kumar,
2009). There are various anomaly detection techniques relevant to the data source
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identified, prior research denotes anomaly detection techniques as: statistical, cognition,
and machine learning based, as depicted in Figure 4 (Jyothsna et al., 2011; GarciaTeodoro et al., 2009).

Figure 4: Anomaly Detection Techniques
(Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009; Jyothsna et al., 2011)
Statistical based anomaly detection techniques capture the network traffic and develop a
behavioral profile. Using statistical properties such as mean and variance to build a
profile of normal activities, then statistical tests are used to determine significant
deviations from the normal profile (Qayyum, Islam, & Jamil, 2005). Within statistical
anomaly detection there are two steps involved: first “normal behavior” is characterized,
then a time frame where behavior does not seem to be normal is determined (Wang &
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Paschalidis, 2015). There are several models within the statistical based techniques this
includes: univariate, multivariate, time series, operational, Markov or Marker models,
and statistical moments (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Univariate models utilize a single metric
as well as multivariate models that use correlations of two or more metrics to determine
deviations (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Time series models uses an interval timer with event
counters or resource measures, then consider the order and time frames of each activity
and their value, so if at a given time the traffic observed is too low it may be identified as
an anomaly (Qayyum et al., 2005). The operational model also referred to as the
threshold metric is based on cardinality of events that happen over a period of time, by
counting events as they occur, then triggering an alert if the number of events is higher or
lower than the specified thresholds (Jyothsna et al., 2011). The marker model is also
known as the ‘Markov model’ which was broken into two approaches: Markov chains
and hidden Markov models (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).
Cao et al., (2015) identified that hidden Markov models (HMM) using one time
series data was insufficient and developed an adaptive HMM (AHMAS) with anomaly
states to detect anomalies based on a sequence of data and not a single value at a point in
time. Within the Markov model, a Markov chain is a set of states connected by transition
probabilities anomalies are detected by comparing the associated probability with the
observed sequence (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). Statistical moments term all identified
correlations as ‘moments’, if an event occurs above or below an identified moment the
activity is deemed to be anomalous (Jyothsna et al., 2011). The moment is a mean or
standard deviation of the correlations, the system determines the confidence interval
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based on observed user data and does not require prior knowledge of normal activities
(Qayyum et al., 2005).
Cognition based anomaly detection consists of finite state machine models,
description scripts, and adept or expert systems (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Cognition based
anomaly detection techniques use human input to determine legitimate behaviors by
having SMEs manually construct the desired model (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). A
finite state machine (FSM), captures actions (entry, exit, & transition action) in states, an
action is a description of an activity to be performed at a given moment and contains
information about the past (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Description scripts are scripting
languages developed by the Intrusion Detection community to identify attacks based on
sequences of specific events by describing signatures of attacks (Jyothsna et al., 2011).
Expert systems classify audit data according to rules, by first identifying different
attributes, then the classification parameters and procedures are determined, then finally
the data is classified accordingly (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).
Machine learning based anomaly detection consists of Baysian networks, generic
algorithms, neural networks, fuzzy logic, and outlier detection models (Jyothsna et al.,
2011). Machine learning based anomaly detection techniques are based on explicit of
implicit models that allow patterns to be analyzed for categorization (Garcia-Teodoro et
al., 2009). Bayesian networks focus on identifying problematic relationships based on
integrated prior knowledge (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). The Baysian network model is
a mathematical framework for combining information to perform estimation by
combining known information to postulate unknown information (Zaknich, 1998). By
attaining knowledge through learning neural network models mimic the brain (Garcia-
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Teodoro et al., 2009). Instead of utilizing precise rules, by using approximate rules fuzzy
logic can improve detection accuracy (Xu, You, & Liu, 2005). Fuzzy logic can be used to
match any input or output of data by focusing on a range of variability and not just an
exact outcome this aids with understanding vague or ambiguous information (Dutta et al.,
2013). Genetic algorithms identify deviations with no prior knowledge of the system
behaviors by using techniques stemming from biology, including inheritance, mutation
and selection (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009). For instance, based on genetic algorithms the
use of a negative selection algorithm that filters out bad solutions tends to reduce the rate
of false positives within anomaly detection (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Outliers are unusual
activities that defer from normal activities (Zhang & Zulkernine, 2006). Outlier detection
consists of grouping data observations according to a given similarity, based on identified
similarities each data point is grouped. Points that fall outside of the grouped clusters are
classified as outliers (Garcia-Teodoro et al., 2009).
Patcha and Park (2007) found that “today’s intrusion detection approaches will
not be able to adequately protect tomorrow’s networks against intrusions and attacks” (p.
3465). Therefore, anomaly detection methods need to be advanced to address this
problem. Jyothsna et al. (2011) denoted that identifying features to characterize user and
system patterns would be the best way to clearly distinguish anomalous activities. Wang
and Paschalidis (2015) found that existing anomaly detection methods tend to focus on
stationary assumptions, suggesting there is no change over time, and therefore proposed a
more robust model for network traffic analysis. Hence, as the anomaly detection methods
evolve, the systems applying these methods need to be advanced as well. This study
developed and validated cyber vital signs to be presented within a cybersecurity insider
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threat dashboard visualization prototype, by incorporating a novel approach to anomaly
detection using SME identified visualization techniques.
Table 4
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature
Study

Methodology

Cao et al.,
2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

Chandola,
Banerjee, &
Kumar, 2009

Literature
review and
synthesis

Instrument or
Construct
Real
Detection
market data of algorithm,
seven
adaptive
representative hidden Markov
stocks:
model with
Google,
anomaly states
Microsoft,
(HMMAS)
Intel, and
Apple from
NASDAQ,
ARM,
BARCLAYS,
and Vodafone
against
OCSVM,
kNN, and
GMM models
Sample

Anomaly
detection

Main Finding or
Contribution
The comparison of
proposed approach
with other
benchmark models,
OCSVM, kNN, and
GMM,
has shown that the
AHMMAS
performs better in
terms of
the area under ROC
curve and the Fmeasure,
respectively.

Current
research has been
done in an
unstructured
fashion, without
relying on a unified
notion of
anomalies, which
makes the job of
providing a
theoretical
understanding of
the anomaly
detection problem.
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Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature (continued)
Instrument or
Construct
Fuzzy logic,
decision
support

Main Finding or
Contribution
Computational
approach
to monitoring vital
signs since the
purpose of such
alerts is to provide
decision support
inputs to careers, to
prompt closer
observations or
direct interventions
to be performed to
help the subjects of
care.

GarciaLiterature
Teodoro et al., review and
2009
analysis

Anomalybased
network
intrusion
detection
systems (ANIDS)

Faster and
more effective
countermeasures
are needed to cope
with the
ever-growing
number of detected
attacks.

Jyothsna,
Prasad, &
Prasad, 2011

Literature
review and
analysis

Intrusion,
anomalybased, and
signature based
detection

Patan, 2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

Signals from a A recurrent
boiler
neural network
with open-loop
control system

Faster and more
effective
countermeasures
are needed to cope
up with the attacks
ever-growing.
In spite of
proper work of the
developed control
algorithms,
selecting
control parameters
were still a
challenge.

Study

Methodology

Sample

Dutta et al.,
2013

Empirical
study via
experiment

Using one
investigator
data was
captured from
the
experiment:
(top to
bottom):
angle,
footplate
force, ECG,
blood
pressure.
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Table 4
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature (continued)
Instrument or
Construct
Anomaly
detection

Main Finding or
Contribution
Traditional
intrusion detection
systems
have not adapted
adequately to new
networking
paradigms like
wireless and mobile
networks
nor have they
scaled to meet the
requirements posed
by high-speed
networks.

Literature
review and
analysis

Anomaly
detection,
intrusion
detection,
security threats

Advantages and
disadvantages of
various techniques
for anomaly
detection.

Wang &
Paschalidis,
2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

Network
anomaly
detection

The statistical
properties of normal
traffic are timevarying
for most actual
communication
networks.

Xu, You, &
Liu, 2005

Empirical
study via
experiment

Negative
selection,
genetic
algorithm,
fuzzy logic

Combined negative
selection and
genetic algorithm to
develop a novel
fuzzy rules based
approach to system
performance
detection.

Study

Methodology

Patcha &
Park, 2007

Literature
review and
analysis

Qayyum,
Islam, &
Jamil, 2005

Sample

Mackey-Glass
Time series
and a publicly
available data
set
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Table 4
Summary of Anomaly Detection Techniques Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Zaknich, 1998

Literature
review and
analysis

Zhang &
Zulkernine,
2006

Empirical
study via
experiment

Sample

Attack data

Instrument or
Construct
modified
probabilistic
neural
network,
general
regression
neural network

Main Finding or
Contribution
Introduced the
MPNN and
described its
relation to Specht’s
GRNN, MPNN has
some advantages
over other neural
networks in
nonlinear signal
processing
applications.

Network
Intrusion
Detection
Systems

A new framework
for unsupervised
anomaly NIDS
based on the outlier
detection technique
in random forests
algorithm.

Insider Threat Analytic Indicators
An insider threat analytic indicator, or for the purpose of this study, cyber
visualization variables, are defined as outputs that may indicate an insider threat and
prompts for further analysis (Casey, 2015). Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak (2012)
suggested that automated and manual countermeasures may be utilized for mitigation
based on indicators that could suggest an increased risk. Alahmadi, Legg, and Nurse
(2015) proposed that a more comprehensive analytic approach incorporating a diverse set
of data with sources from technological, behavioral, and physiological monitoring is
more effective in recognition, detection and response to insider threats. Casey, Koeberl,
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and Vishik (2010) stressed the importance of threat agent analysis to help form a
“coherent picture of the threat space and priorities of remediation” (p. 1).
Casey (2007) developed a model for simplified depiction of threat agents. The
Threat Agent Library (TAL) provides a consistent reference library describing the human
agents involved in IT systems and that could pose threats to such kind of systems,
although not limited to insider threats (Nostro, Ceccarelli, Bondavalli, & Brancati, 2013).
Carcary (2013) noted the TAL as applicable for effective risk management. Ceccarelli et
al. (2015) notes that identifying possible human agents that could pose a threat to IS can
be very challenging, and the TAL provides a standardized set of agents. The TAL
allowed for easy classification of insider threat agents and variables (see Figure 4).
Insider attacks are difficult to detect, and many attackers operate within their
granted restrictions, thus, identification of potential threat agents aided in insider threat
mitigation (Nostro et al., 2013). In this study, cyber visualization variables were
identified using SMEs. In order to identify insider threats and the variables associated
with potential threats, an understanding of who a potential threat agent is needed
(Callegati, Giallorenzo, Melis, & Prandini, 2016). This study presents a novel way of
addressing the prevailing problem faced when detecting malicious cyber insiders.
Consequently, Figure 5 presents insider threat agent types as malicious, non-malicious, or
either. This study focused on potential threats that are highlighted in Figure 5, these threat
agents are identified as ‘malicious or either’. The threat agents within the scope of this
study are identified as: vendors, partners, irrational individuals, thief, disgruntled
individuals, activists, terrorists, organized crime, competitors, and nation states.
Depending upon the type of threat agent correlated attack types are depicted. Nostro et al.
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(2013) utilized this predefined library of insiders in order to efficiently perform tasks
relevant to the focus of their study and show completeness of the assessment of insiders.
The same approach has been utilized for the purpose of this study.

Figure 5: Threat Agent Library (TAL)(Casey, 2007)
Casey (2007) also presented analytics based on attack types, providing a
comprehensive list of analytic indicators. For the purpose of this study, these analytic
indicators provided a foundation as the initial list of critical cyber visualization variables.
Based on the variable and type of analytic indicator the determination of whether the
variable is applicable when identifying potentially malicious cyber insiders can be
determined. Data associated with the identified variable needs to be depicted in the
developed cyber visualization. Wang and Jones (2017) suggested that flows, logs and
system events (alerts) are typically used for intrusion detection. Cappelli et al. (2012)
identified that log traffic may be inspected for indicators of “suspicious access, large file
transfers, suspicious email traffic, after-hours access, or use of removable media by
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resigning employees” (p. 93). Brdiczka et al. (2012) denoted that model variables can be
associated with observable indicators. Figure 6 depicts an initial set of variables for the
identification of potentially malicious insider cyber threats, and the associated data.

Figure 6: Initial Analytic Variables and Data Types (Casey, 2015)
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Table 5
Summary of Insider Threat Analytic Indicators Literature
Study

Methodology

Sample

Alahmadi,
Legg, &
Nurse, 2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

1000
randomly
selected
websites

Brdiczka,
Price, Shen,
Patil, Chow,
Bart, &
Ducheneaut,
2012

Empirical
study via
experiment

350,000
multi-player
online game
characters
observed
over a period
of 6 months

Callegati,
Literature
Giallorenzo,
review and
Melis, &
analysis
Prandini, 2016

Cappelli,
Moore, &
Trzeciak,
2012

Literature
review and
synthesis

CERT
Database

Instrument or
Construct
Website–
OCEAN
personality
correlation
tool, insider
threat
application

Main Finding or
Contribution
An individuals
browsing interests
can lead to
inferences about
their personality
traits, and if
monitored can be
utilized to identify
potential insider
threat.

Structural
anomaly
detection,
psychological
context
modeling

An approach for
proactive detection
of insider threats by
combining
structural anomaly
detection,
information
networks, and
psychological
profiling of
individuals.

Threat agents

Developing a
Federated
marketplace of
services called
SMAll, aimed at
harmonizing data
flows and service
invocations.

Theft,
sabotage, fraud

Identification of
types of insiders
with varying
motives of why
they perform
malicious activities.
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Table 5
Summary of Insider Threat Analytic Indicators Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Carcary, 2013

Literature
review and
analysis

Casey,
Koeberl, &
Vishik, 2010

Theoretical

Ceccarelli,
Montecchi,
Brancati,
Lollini,
Marguglio, &
Bondavalli,
2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

Nostro,
Empirical
Ceccarelli,
study via case
Bondavalli, & study
Brancati, 2013

Instrument or
Construct
Risk
management

Main Finding or
Contribution
A new IT Risk
Management
maturity model.

Threat agents,
threat agent
library (TAL)

Standardization of
threat agents.

Data for four
different
biometric
traits applied
within a math
lab

Context
aware security
by hierarchical
multilevel
architectures
(CASHMA),
TAL, ADVISE
(ADversary
VIew Security
Evaluation)
modeling
formalism

Utilized biometrics
to define a protocol
for continuous
authentication that
improves security
and usability of user
sessions.

A service
oriented
system

TAL, ADVISE
(ADversary
VIew Security
Evaluation)
modeling
formalism

Defined the
motivations and
targets of insiders,
investigate the
likeliness
and severity of
potential violations,
and identified
appropriate
countermeasures.

Sample
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Table 5
Summary of Insider Threat Analytic Indicators Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Wang &
Jones, 2017

Literature
review and
synthesis

Sample

Instrument or
Construct
Big data
analytics,
anomaly
detection,
misuse
detection

Main Finding or
Contribution
Methods for
network intrusion
detection, stream
data characteristics
and stream
processing systems,
feature extraction
and data reduction,
conventional data
mining and machine
learning, deep
learning, and Big
Data analytics in
network intrusion
detection.

Information Visualization
Information visualization is defined as communicating and perceiving data, both
abstract and scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014). Using
effective visualization interfaces within cybersecurity allows the ability to understand
anomalies using data from complex cyber networks (Inibhunu et al., 2016). Rohrer and
Swing (1997) attested that when dealing with unstructured data utilizing the proper visual
mapping would be essential for producing effective visualizations. However, Fink et al.
(2009) noted that most cyber analysis still utilized archaic command-line tools that are
ineffective at presenting large volumes of rapidly moving data. Choi, Lee, and Kim
(2009) proposed a new visualization technique to detect anomalies from Internet attacks
since traditional IDSs were not able to detect unknown attacks without triggering a
significant amount of false positive alerts. Visualizations should be useful in presenting
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unstructured data, and not only be valuable in presenting an outcome once it is already
known (Kandel, Paepcke, Hellerstein, & Heer, 2012).
Inibhunu et al. (2016) argued that using level of detail viewing would increase
performance and decrease information overload, facilitating effective mitigation
decisions within cybersecurity. Fink et al. (2009) believed large, high-resolution displays
with interoperable, flexible, and compelling visualization tools are core components of a
usable workspace for cyber analysts. However, they did not examine how the actual
information displayed using the visualizations should be enhanced to support cyber
analysts. Since the focus of the visualizations that were being developed were not being
tailored towards the needs of a cybersecurity analyst. After surveying 32 analysts, Kandel
et al. (2012) found that analysts would like visualizations that allow them to apply
advanced analytics routines, explore models, and visualize the output. McKenna et al.
(2015) identified that more cyber visualizations need to be developed from the
perspective of cybersecurity analysts.
McKenna, Mazur, Agutter, and Meyer (2014) provided a framework for
actionable guidance throughout the visualization design process by focusing on two
models for visualization design, decision models to capture the rational behind the
decisions designers make, and process models capturing the actions made. This allowed
visualization designers to verify and validate design decisions, allowing the final design
to be more applicable to the real world. McKenna et al. (2015) assessed that only 40% of
visualization research gathered user needs prior to developing a tool, thus, they assessed
user needs within cybersecurity, developed, and then validated the visualization.
However, the validation was only performed with one cybersecurity analyst. Walton et al.
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(2015) noted that there are multiple shortcomings of visual analytics workflows proposed
a scalable loop for continuous improvements of the models being used to contribute to
the development of more proactive and visual models. While McKenna et al. (2015) as
well as Walton et al. (2015) approached the cyber visualization problem from a user
focused perspective, the resultant models developed do not hone in on the user of interest
or potential malicious insider. Therefore, the analysts needed to determine this based on
the presented visualizations.
Table 6
Summary of Information Visualization Literature
Instrument or
Construct
Traffic flow
generator

Main Finding or
Contribution
The development of
parallel coordinate
attack visualization
(PCAV) a real-time
visualization system
for anomaly
detection.

8 cyber
analysts at a
government
laboratory

Visualization

Designed usable
workspaces for
cyber analysts.

Millions of
records from
firewall and
IDS logs for a
fictitious
organization

Cyber situation Level of detail
awareness
viewing can greatly
increase human
performance by
mitigating
information
overload.

Study

Methodology

Sample

Choi, Lee, &
Kim, 2009

Empirical
study via
experiment

A real-life
Internet attack
traffic trace
(Network
packets)

Fink, North,
Endert, &
Rose, 2009

Empirical
study via
experiment

Inibhunu et
al., 2016

Empirical
study via data
analysis
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Table 6
Summary of Information Visualization Literature (continued)
Instrument or
Construct

Main Finding or
Contribution

Visualization

As the scale and
diversity of data
sources increases
within enterprises,
there is an
opportunity for
visual analytic tools
to improve the
quality of analysis
and the speed at
which it takes place.

Literature
review and
analysis

Design activity
framework,
cognitive task
analysis

Personas, their
behaviors, and their
knowledge played a
critical role in
helping to decide
which users
and needs to target
in the visualization
design process.

Theoretical

Visualization

Visualization
researchers should
exploit the
experience gained
over the last two
decades in virtual
reality (VR)
research, while
continuing to apply
VR technology to
visualization
systems.

Study

Methodology

Sample

Kandel,
Paepcke,
Hellerstein, &
Heer, 2012

Empirical
study via
interviews

35 data
analysts in a
commercial
organization

McKenna et
al., 2015

Roberts et al.,
2014
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Summary of Information Visualization Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Rohrer &
Swing, 1997

Literature
review and
analysis

Walton et al.,
2015

Empirical
study via case
study

Sample

Selection of
visualizations
from the
system,
CITD
(Corporate
Insider Threat
Detection)
Dashboard

Instrument or
Construct
Information
visualization

Main Finding or
Contribution
Interlinking
visualization
components with
other Web media
and data is useful
since it offers fairly
seamless integration
of related
information for end
users.

Dashboard
visualization

Introduced a visual
analytics loop for
protective
monitoring in
cybersecurity
applications, and a
prototype tool
demonstrating an
example
implementation of
the approach.

IS Effectiveness
Though prior studies have struggled to define effectiveness as well as how to
accurately measure effectiveness (Bailey & Pearson, 1983; Doll, Xia, & Torkzadeh,
1994; Lee, Kim, & Lee, 1995). Effectiveness has been defined as the extent to which the
IS contributes to the accomplishment of objectives (Kim, 1989). Levy (2006) denoted
that the complete measurement of IS effectiveness must include measures of the causal
factors or ‘values’ as well as the end result construct or ‘user satisfaction’ (p. 60). Levy,
Murphy, and Zanakis (2010) emphasized the importance of value as an important
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construct within IS research. Levy (2006) denoted that Value Theory and User
Satisfaction theory suggests that values impact attitudes which impact behaviors, and in
turn impacts satisfaction (p. 6). Therefore, this study addressed perceived effectiveness as
a measure of value and satisfaction.
User satisfaction with an IS is related to the utilization and success of a system,
and can be measured in an effort to improve the system (Bailey & Pearson, 1983). Levy
(2006) indicated that satisfaction should be measured as a ‘surrogate’ for measurement of
IS effectiveness (p. 42). Bano, Zowghi, and Rimini (2017) found that user involvement in
the development process leads to higher levels of user satisfaction. Kurucay and Inan
(2017) stated that user satisfaction is a strong determinant of effectiveness. User
satisfaction is an important theoretical issue, however, Doll et al. (1994) argued that it is a
one-dimensional construct. Bailey and Pearson (1983) argued satisfaction is a bidimensional attitude, thus, the intensity of an individuals reaction relative to the
information requirements must also be measured (Bailey & Pearson, 1983). Bano et al.
(2017) also confirmed satisfaction to be bi-dimensional, as it entails user satisfaction with
their involvement process and satisfaction with the delivered product.
Value is defined as the core belief about a level of importance that the user
attributes to the system (Levy, 2006; Hackney, Dooley, Levy, & Parrish, 2015; Dooley,
Levy, Hackney, & Parrish, 2017). The expectancy value-theory explains motivation as a
combination of the users needs and the value of the goals in the system (Sigaard & Skov,
2015). According to Sedera, Lokuge, Grover, Sarker, and Sarker (2016) for innovation to
take hold within systems their needs to be increased value. For this study the developed
cyber visualization prototype was considered effective when the SMEs perceive the
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developed prototype as highly important and the SMEs are highly satisfied with the
visualizations (Levy, 2006). Levy (2006) used a Likert-type rating scale for assessing
value items. Sedera et al. (2016) utilized a 7-point Likert rating scale to assess value of
enterprise systems and digital platforms, finding that digital platforms can yield
innovation, only through the moderation of the enterprise system platforms. Kurucay and
Inan (2017) utilized a 5-point Likert rating scale to determine student satisfaction with
online learning, to gauge the effectiveness of the online course. Thus, this study utilized a
7-point Likert-type rating scale for satisfaction and value assessment.
Table 7
Summary of IS Effectiveness Literature

Empirical
study via
survey and
case study

Instrument or
Construct
29
Survey using a
questionnaires seven-point
; 32 manager
scale of
interviews
satisfaction

Main Finding or
Contribution
Measurement of IS
user satisfaction.

Bano,
Zowghi, &
Rimini, 2017

Empirical
study via case
study
interviews

Secondary
data from two
case studies,
12 subjects

Three-point
scale of
satisfaction

User satisfaction is
considered to
contribute to system
success.

Doll, Xia, &
Torkzadeh,
1994

Empirical
study via
survey

409 computer
users

End user
computing
satisfaction
(EUCS)

Validation that the
12-item EUCS
instrument explains
and measures user
satisfaction.

Study

Methodology

Bailey &
Pearson, 1983

Sample
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Summary of IS Effectiveness Literature (continued)
Instrument or
Construct
27
Effectiveness,
competencies Bayesian belief
compared on
network, SE
successful and REI
challenged
projects
50 lecturers
System
from the
Usability Scale
Computer
(SUS)
Science and
Electrical
Engineering
at different
universities

Main Finding or
Contribution
System engineering
(SE) Relative
Effectiveness Index
(REI) model can be
used to assess SE
performance.
System Usability
Scale is not
adequately a
standalone measure
for expressing the
true acceptance
and satisfaction.

Empirical
study via
experiment

77 students in
an online
course

24 items on a
five-point
Likert scale

Interaction among
learners in online
courses lead the
higher student
satisfaction.

Lee, Kim, &
Lee, 1995

Empirical
study via case
study and
survey

236 end users
from 11
companies

Satisfaction,
EUCS

There is a strong
relationship among
end-user IS
acceptance, IS
satisfaction and job
satisfaction.

Levy, 2006

Empirical
study via
experiment

192
undergraduate
students

IS
Effectiveness,
LeVIS index,
EUCS

Identifying and
defining the
relationship
between value and
satisfaction in order
to indicate IS
effectiveness.

Study

Methodology

Doskey,
Mazzuchi, &
Sarkani, 2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

Harrati,
Bouchrika,
Tari, &
Ladjailia,
2016

Empirical
study via
experiment

Kurucay &
Inan, 2017

Sample
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Summary of IS Effectiveness Literature (continued)
Study

Methodology

Sample

Sigaard &
Skov, 2015

Empirical
study via
experiment

7
professionals
who seek
information as
a job

Sedera,
Lokuge,
Grover,
Sarker, &
Sarker, 2016

Empirical
study via
experiment

189
organization

Instrument or
Construct
Expectancy
value theory,

Main Finding or
Contribution
The theory of
expectancy-value
more directly
measures the effect
of subjectively
perceived value and
perception of own
capability on
information-seeking
behavior.

Effectiveness,
seven-point
Likert scale

Digital platforms
can yield
innovation, only
through the
moderation of the
enterprise system
platforms.

Summary of What is Known and Unknown in Research Literature
In this section a review of literature was performed on constructs applicable to
anomaly and intrusion detection. As a result, constructs relevant constructs applicable to
anomaly and intrusion detection when assessing insider threat detection were identified.
The presented literature review provides a summary of what is known and unknown
within anomaly and intrusion detection as it pertains to identifying anomalous activities
of malicious cyber insiders.
Problems within cybersecurity are different from traditional security problems,
since cybersecurity issues involve human intelligence applied in order to circumvent the
standard operations of a system. Solving cybersecurity issues require a different approach
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(Toecker, 2014). Nations rely upon cyber systems that may inherently possess many
vulnerabilities, and if exploited could be defibrillating (Harknett & Stever, 2011). It is
unknown if national strategies account for technical, tactical, and operational advances in
cybersecurity. Another problem within cybersecurity pertains to anomaly detection
systems, which are a subset of intrusion detection systems, however, IDSs are not
adequate for detecting anomalous activities (Patcha & Park, 2007). An anomaly detection
system utilizing the applicable anomaly detection technique would be best suited for the
detection of unknown activities (Jyothsna et al., 2011). Parsing through unknown
activities to determine normal versus anomalous activities can be difficult for cyber
analysts. Thus, cyber analysts struggle with analytic-focus or processing large volumes of
data and providing valuable insights (Shneiderman & Plaisant, 2015). Though
Shneiderman and Plaisant (2015) identified multiple focusing strategies, they were
unable to determine which strategies are relevant in what situation.
Visualizations will assist cyber analysts by helping them to identify problems and
work towards a viable solution (Fink et al., 2009). Using visualization interfaces in
cybersecurity allows for better understanding of anomalies when interacting with data
from complex cyber networks (Inibhunu et al., 2016). Though visualizations were
identified as an appropriate method for anomaly identification, methods for the
integration of a ‘FocalPoint’ and classifying an adequate display interface were to be
determined. Therefore, the development of a visualization prototype that visualized
already parsed data in a consumable form factor pertinent to cyber professionals better
enable detection and prevention of malicious cyber insider threats.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Overview of Research Design
The study is grounded in developmental research and was conducted in three
phases, as depicted in Figure 7, to develop and validate the newly designed prototype that
aided in identifying anomalous activities of malicious cyber insiders. This developmental
research developed a prototype, identified as a ‘thing’ in order to address a problem,
which is considered the foundation of developmental research by Ellis and Levy (2009).
The critical cyber visualization variables were identified and ranked based on SMEs’
input utilizing the Delphi method. As a result, the initial version of QUICK.v™ was
developed.
First, the critical cyber visualization variables are identified and ranked. Then
simulated data was utilized to depict complex cyber data correlations and the top six
critical cyber visualization variables to the SME participants. In order to determine the
valid visualization techniques that should be applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™. Next, based on the identified visualization
techniques, the preliminary prototype was refined to apply the techniques identified as
most valid when presenting complex data correlations and the top six critical cyber
visualization variables. Subsequently, this study validated the perceived effectiveness of
the developed prototype using SME analysis. To determine the perceived effectiveness of
QUICK.v™, quantitative data was collected based on each SMEs rating of the
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prototypes’ value and their level of satisfaction. Finally, the finalized version of
QUICK.v™ as well as the visualization techniques used was detailed within the findings
and recommendations. Identifying and assessing the risk score is beyond the scope of this
study. Risk calculation was addressed in the AI-InCyThR™ prototype (Hueca et al.,
2016).

Figure 7: Research Design Process for the Development of a
Cybersecurity Visualization Prototype
Phase 1
Phase one consisted of an exploratory study. This approach is generally taken
when little is known about the problem at hand or no information is available on how
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similar problems have been solved (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Legg et al. (2015)
identified the insider threat topic as recently attaining attention within research and that
real-world data is rarely used to address the problem. With the recent growth of big data
analytics and the integration of many diverse data sources, new research solutions are
needed for monitoring and analysis (Boukri & Chaoui, 2015). With the limited amount of
research currently addressing the problem of detecting malicious cyber insiders, an
exploratory research method is appropriate for this study. To identify the critical cyber
visualization variables needed when displaying complex data correlations, extensive
literature analysis was performed for the foundation of this research. With the completion
of an extensive literature analysis to develop a better understanding of the research
problem and formulate the research questions, each phase of this study was performed.
Phase one of this research included two parts. First, it identified the critical cyber
visualization variables using SMEs that should be displayed when using applications to
detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats. Second, the first phase of this study
provided the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that
should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization
prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber insider activities.
Research question one was addressed in phase one by obtaining critical cyber
visualization variables from SMEs over multiple Delphi iterations. Research question two
also addressed in phase one by obtaining the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical
cyber visualization variables that should be displayed. SMEs’ was used to validate and
rank order the critical cybersecurity visualization variables identified in literature (see
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Appendix A), the developed cyber visualization prototype should incorporate that may
aid in identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats.
SMEs were asked to review the initial list of cyber variables obtained within
literature and select the most critical variables from this list. SMEs were then asked to
add any additional variables they deem as critical, but are not displayed in the initial list.
Next, the SMEs were asked to select their top six critical variables from the list they have
created. SME responses were considered for the next round of data collection, based on
prior selections. The final sets of cyber variables selected were then reviewed with the
SMEs’. SMEs were asked to validate the list by adding or removing variables; once the
list is finalized those variables were applied moving forward. This addressed research
question one - what are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider cyber
threats?
After the SMEs’ critical cyber visualization variables have been validated, they
were asked to rank the order of the critical cyber visualization variables the developed
prototype should include that may aid in identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber
threats. Research question two also addressed in phase one by obtaining the ranking of
the critical cyber visualization variables from SMEs over multiple Delphi iterations. The
SMEs were presented the finalized list of variables and asked to rank the variables from
most-to-least important. The SMEs were asked to provide a rank order for the identified
variables in relation to how imperative that data is as a precursor when investigating
potentially malicious cybersecurity insider threats. The highest weighted variables
identified were referred to as cybersecurity ‘vital signs’. The ranking was analyzed to
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determine the final top six critical cyber visualization variables. This addressed research
question two - what is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat dashboard
visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber insider activities?
Participants in phase one consisted of at least 30 SMEs. From the group of 30
SMEs a focus group was selected to validate the final list of identified critical cyber
visualization variables. Focus group participants consisted of eight to ten of the most
experienced SMEs. Experience was based on number of years worked within
cybersecurity, based on the SMEs demographic information. Applying the Delphi
technique within a virtual lab environment, each SMEs was asked to review a list of
critical cyber variables and identify the rank order of identified critical cyber
visualization variables used when monitoring for potentially malicious cybersecurity
insider threats.
Phase 2
Participants within phase two consisted of at least 30 SMEs. Phase two also
consisted of two parts. SMEs first identified the most valid visualization techniques to
present complex cyber data correlations. Second, phase two identified the visualization
techniques most valid to present top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect
potentially malicious cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™. In phase one, the validated and ranked critical cyber
visualization variables that have been collected from SMEs were applied within phase
two. This consisted of SMEs’ identifying the most valid presentation of complex data
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correlations using the identified critical visualization variables over multiple visualization
techniques.
In phase two, the preliminary prototype was developed using the ranked
cybersecurity vital signs identified by the SMEs in phase one. SMEs were presented each
vital sign using three different visualization techniques and asked to select their preferred
visualization technique for presenting complex cyber data correlations. Once an initial set
of visualization technique has been identified, the SMEs were presented options for the
most utilized visualization techniques found in literature. This addressed the research
question three - what SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the predesignated critical cyber visualization
variables that are applied in the developed cyber visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
Second, phase two identified visualization techniques that are most valid when
presenting the top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious
cyber insider activities. Based on the validated and ranked critical cyber visualization
variables identified in phase one, SME analysis were performed of the most valid
visualization technique for presenting the top six critical cyber visualization variables.
The preliminary prototype was refined to implement the validated SME criteria for the
visualization design. Not all of the SME identified variables were able to be applied to
QUICK.v™, the rank order from phase one was vital to determining which variables are
presented using a validated visualization techniques. This addressed the RQ4 - what
SMEs identified visualization techniques are most valid to present top six critical cyber
visualization variables to detect potentially malicious cyber insider activities that are
applied within the developed cyber visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
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The vital signs were presented to at least 30 cybersecurity and visualization SMEs
using the most applicable visualization technique as identified in literature. Using the
Delphi method the SMEs were asked to perform an analysis of the visualization
techniques employed to present the complex cyber data correlations and each
cybersecurity vital sign. This study controlled the visualization techniques used in the
final prototype. Once SMEs have identified the critical cyber visualization variables and
the most valid visualization techniques, modifications may need to be made to fit the
form factor of the final prototype. Researcher interference was involved since the sample
and the configuration of the prototype developed was controlled in the study.
Data collection was performed using an experiment in a contrived setting. Using a
contrived setting allowed for extensive control over the experiment, as well as allow for
control of external nuisance factors (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). A lab environment was
utilized for each experiment allowing quantitative and qualitative data to be captured
from the participants. A lab experiment also allowed for the selection of a homogenous
set of participants, or participants with similar backgrounds in cybersecurity. Selecting
similar participants added to the validity of this study by allowing the measured effects to
be based on a particular group (Levy & Ellis, 2011). In relation to this study the selected
group was cybersecurity and visualization SMEs.
Phase 3
Participants within phase three consisted of at least 20 SMEs. Phase three entailed
conducting and experimental study using SMEs’ to assess the perceived effectiveness of
the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating malicious insiders. In the third phase another
virtual lab experiment was performed within a contrived setting. In this experiment the
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SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables and visualization techniques
identified within phase one and obtaining the perceived effectiveness of the developed
prototype validated two. The effectiveness measure was based on the level of satisfaction
and value measures obtained from the SMEs. These individual scores was used to
determine the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™, based on the results of the data
analysis performed on the quantitative data gathered from the cybersecurity SMEs. This
addressed RQ5 - what is the SMEs’ implied effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction and
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially malicious
cyber insider threats? Then, the validated QUICK.v™ prototype was presented along
with recommendations and conclusions.

Instruments and Prototype Development
When visualizations are designed often times there are no explicit connections
stated as to why the designer chose to utilize a particular technique Mckenna et al. (2014)
addressed this problem by developing the design activity framework to directly connect
each design activity with the corresponding design decision. Mckenna et al. (2015)
identified the lack of developmental research utilizing cyber analyst or SME input
throughout the design process. However, they struggled with obtaining direct access to
cyber analysts. Using feedback from one cyber analyst qualitative coding of the current
body of knowledge was applied. Additionally, Inibhunu et al. (2016) sought to increase
the perceived effectiveness of cyber visualization tools by developing a system to provide
adaptive level of detail in the interface. While the system was introduced the
effectiveness of the system developed was not determined (Inibhunu et al., 2016).
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Insider threat detection is a complex problem for cyber analysts. Walton et al.
(2015) proposed a scalable visual analytics loop for continuous development of detection
models. Nevertheless, there are limitations within today’s cyber visualizations and
additional work to advance visualizations is needed. However, input from cyber analysts
is essential to develop and evaluate the perceived effectiveness, thus the resultant cyber
visualization may be ready for real world application. The goal of this study is to develop
and validate a cyber insider threat dashboard visualization prototype. To develop novel
cyber visualizations, SME input was utilized for the development and evaluation of this
research as depicted in Figure 8, a missing element among earlier works. The
development process for QUICK.v™ included the following steps. Step one includes
utilizing SMEs to identify the relevant cyber visualization variables. Step two consisted
of identifying the rank order of the visualization variables previously identified. Step
three used the identified visualization variables to determine valid visualization
techniques. Step four included applying the visualization variables and the validated
visualization techniques to the development of QUICK.v™. Finally, step six assessed the
perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™.
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Figure 8: QUICK.v™ Development Process to Enhance
Perceived Effectiveness by Assessing Satisfaction and Value
Instrument for SMEs Identification of Cyber Visualization Variables
In order to identify the cyber visualization variables SMEs were given the survey
instrument presented in Appendix D. Appendix A depicts a template for how the
qualitative survey was administered to the SME’s. A survey refers to “gathering
information about the characteristics, actions, or opinions of a large group of people,
referred to as a population” (Pinsonneault & Kraemer, 1993, p. 2). For this survey the
population consisted of cybersecurity analysts. By using survey research, information
was gathered for measurement and understanding, thus, qualitative information was
gathered to describe an aspect of the studied population, which in this case were the cyber
visualization variables (Pinsonneault, & Kraemer, 1993). The survey consisted of
presenting pertinent terms in relation to the scope of this research. Next, SMEs were
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asked to identify data variables and rank their identified variables in relation to
identifying insider threats. Variables utilized were deemed as cybersecurity vital signs
that were ranked by the SME. Overlapping variables identified by the SMEs were
assessed based on the denoted prioritization, then translated into linked objectives to
group similar variables into cybersecurity vital signs (Keeney, 1999). The results from
this survey were used to address research question one and two by identifying and
ranking using SMEs the critical cyber visualization variables that should be displayed
when using applications to detect potentially malicious insiders cyber threats.
Instrument for SMEs Identification of Visualization Technique for Cyber Variables
Once the cybersecurity vital signs have been identified, the next step is to
determine the appropriate visualization techniques for each vital sign. The qualitative
survey in Appendix G was administered to SMEs using their criteria for visualizing each
of the depicted cyber visualization variables. Appendix B depicts a template for how the
qualitative survey was administered to the SME’s. The final visualization techniques for
each variable was updated and applied within this survey instrument once data collection
and analysis utilizing Appendix D was completed. Thus, allowing for the identification of
the most valid visualization techniques to present the top six critical cyber visualization
variables, therefore, Appendix B was only for illustration purposes. In Appendix B
segments of the preliminary prototype were presented to the SMEs depicting the cyber
visualization variables they previously identified. Simulated data was used within the
prototype to allow SMEs to assess and identify the data points they referenced, as well as
their preferred technique of depicting the presented information. The prototype
development was iterative; this involved several stages of information and user input
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since initial prototypes tend to be tossed because of poorly understood requirements that
are later validated based upon the preliminary prototype. However, throughout this
process much experience is gained allowing for the development of a production quality
prototype (Ozcan & Morrey, 1995). In this study, exclusion of the preliminary prototype
may be avoided by presenting the components that make up the final prototype to the
SMEs for validation. This survey consisted of presenting individual cyber visualization
variables as identified by the SMEs using varying visualization techniques. The SMEs
were asked to select their preferred technique for the depicted cyber visualization
variable. The results from this survey, addressed research question three by identifying
using SMEs the most valid visualization techniques to present complex cyber data
correlations relevant to the predesignated critical cyber visualization variables.
QUICK.v™ Prototype Development
The prototype included validated visualization techniques for effective
presentation of cyber visualization variables. Based on visualization techniques as
identified in literature and validated by the SMEs, the techniques that are ideal for
presenting the SME identified cyber related data would be identified and administered
within QUICK.v™. This conceptual design is depicted in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Conceptual Design for QUICK.v™

76
Once each cyber visualization variable was obtained and ranked, an ideal
visualization technique was identified for the presentation of that cyber visualization
variable within the display. The SMEs were able to validate or identify other manners
they deem as best to depict the relevant cyber visualization variable. The validated
visualization techniques were then used to develop QUICK.v™. For each identified cyber
visualization variable the expert was asked to assign a weight. Based on the assigned
weight of each cyber visualization variable the variable rank order was determined.
Visualization techniques were identified for the pertinent cyber visualization variables.
The techniques applied were then used to build the dashboard-based presentation of the
QUICK.v™ prototype. Based on SME input many visualization techniques were taken
into consideration for this prototype, based on literature some may include chord, sankey,
dendograms, or line chart diagrams. Chou, Wang, and Ma (2016) identified sankey
diagrams as being visually informative and utilized sankey diagrams to present data flows
allowing for the identification of potential privacy concerns. Noel (2011) utilized
dendograms to visualize cyber attack patterns since this provided an automated and
mathematically sound way to present the hierarchical attack clusters. The selected
visualization techniques were presented to SMEs for evaluation. SMEs were utilized to
determine if the appropriate visualization technique has been selected to present the
SMEs’ previously identified cyber visualization variables.
Instrument for Cybersecurity Analysts’ Effectiveness of the Prototype
Once the QUICK.v™ prototype has been developed based on the SME identified
cyber visualization variables and visualization techniques, the perceived effectiveness of
the developed prototype were measured. Using SMEs the perceived effectiveness of the
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cyber visualization variables presented and the visualization techniques used were
identified. Effectiveness refers to usefulness or productive use of the technology that may
affect job performance and utilitarian value, which also plays a significant role in user
acceptance of the technology (Levy, 2006; Dooley, Hackney, Dooley, Levy, & Parrish,
2015; Coursaris & van Osch, 2016; Levy, Hackney, & Parrish, 2017). Hong, Tai, Hwang,
Kuo, and Chen (2017) utilized determinants of satisfaction and utility value within 150
questionnaires to determine effectiveness of using government e-learning systems. IS
effectiveness has been difficult to evaluate. By examining the satisfaction and value of
specific cyber visualization variable the perceived effectiveness of the system can be
determined (Doll, Xai, & Torkzadeh, 1994). For this study, IS effectiveness was
measured by obtaining user value and satisfaction (Levy, 2006). The survey in Appendix
I was administered to SMEs to obtain ratings for satisfaction and value of the developed
cyber visualization prototype. The survey consisted of a seven-point Likert scale
assessing each cyber visualization variables and the visualization methods utilized in the
final version of QUICK.v™. The survey was administered to SMEs using the online tool,
survey monkey.
Expert Panel
An expert is a person qualified to address subjects from a relevant discipline
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). To determine the relevant cyber visualization variables, SME
input was obtained using the Delphi method. Based on the input obtained from the SMEs
over multiple iterations of data collection, a user-centered design process was followed
for the development of QUICK.v™. Capturing expert knowledge can be difficult but it is
important for applying their experiences to a domain problem (Okesola, Ogunseye, &
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Folorunso, 2010). Cyber SMEs tend to be extremely busy and obtaining their time can be
very difficult (McKenna et al., 2015). In order to optimize the time obtained from cyber
SMEs and get the most reliable consensus from the group the Delphi method was utilized
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963). Additionally, for this reason the Delphi method has been used
extensively within past research (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014; Rowe & Wright, 1999;
Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). The Delphi method consisted of posing questions
to the SMEs that are all centered on a central problem (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).
For the purpose of this study, all questions were focused on the problem of
detecting potentially malicious cyber insider threats. Prior to data collection, at least 30
SMEs in the cybersecurity or visualization industry was solicited for participation. SMEs
with a background in cybersecurity was recruited from industry and consulting agencies.
Since feedback was needed from the same SMEs once the prototype is completed, an
experienced focus group of SMEs was sought to ensure they are still available for the
prototype evaluation. SMEs were offered an incentive for their participation upon
completion of phase three. Gray and Hovav (2014) denote the advantages of the Delphi
method included:
•

Maintaining focus on the issue

•

Providing a framework for individuals to work

•

Minimizing participants tendencies to agree with the leader

•

Providing equal opportunity for input

•

Providing documented output (p. 343)

Sun et al., (2006) as well as Ramim, Lichvar (2014) utilized Delphi techniques, as it was
beneficial for obtaining consensus among SMEs on a particular topic. Thus, the Delphi
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technique was used when obtaining the cyber visualization variables and rank order for
the development of the visualization prototype.

Reliability and Validity
To prove that the developed instrument measures what it was intended to, the
validity was pertinent to the research process (Straub, 1989). In this study data analysis
needs to be conducted on three sets of data. The first point of data collection was
obtained during phase one, based on the initial SME surveys the cyber visualization
variables that were used to develop the prototype was determined. Then the identified
cyber visualization variables were correlated to a practical visualization technique, used
to depict the most simplified and understandable display of the complex data correlations.
The second point of data collection was obtained within phase two, in which applicable
visualization techniques were identified to display each vital sign. The visualization
techniques were presented within a preliminary prototype to the SMEs for validation. The
third point of data collection was once the prototype was developed to identify the
perceived effectiveness of the prototype by validating the SMEs satisfaction and value
pertaining to the cyber visualization variables and visualization techniques used within
the developed prototype.
Reliability
The cyber visualization prototype was developed to enhance the presentation of
complex data correlations when mitigating malicious insiders cyber threat. Surveys were
administered to SMEs using the Delphi method. Since respondents can be inconsistent or
unmotivated reliability may become an issue, which this study addressed (St. Louis,
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Lubker, Yaruss, & Aliveto, 2009). SMEs were incentivized for participation, motivating
them to continue throughout each phase of this study. The reliability of QUICK.v™ is
determined based on the extent to which the developed product is without bias (Sekaran
& Bougie, 2009). By utilizing an accepted consensus building process like the Delphi
Method to obtain SME input, the reliability of this study was established (Ellis & Levy,
2010). Particular attention was also paid to variations in answers from the SMEs, since
misunderstanding the questions could lead to measurement errors or irrelevant
requirements (Straub, 1989).
Validity
An instrument may be invalid based on the measurement items content (Straub,
1989). Threats to internal validity include selection bias and statistical regression
contamination. A threat to external validity is population validity (Sekaran & Bougie,
2009). Population validity refers to generalizing research findings from a subset of a
population as applicable to the entire population. If the sample has not been randomly
selected from an accessible population, the experimenter cannot generalize to a larger
group of participants, the relationship between the treatment variable and the
characteristics of the target population helped determine if experimenter can generalize to
the target population (Bracht & Glass, 1968). If the members of an experiment are
selected randomly the potential problem of statistical regression contaminating the
experiment will not occur (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Thoroughly defining the target
population and selecting the accessible population by ensuring that similar characteristics
apply within both populations may reduce the potential for population validity bias
(Bracht & Glass, 1968).
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When conducting the experiments there is potential for selection bias to occur
since the members of the participant groups needed to have a particular skill set within
cybersecurity. The potential for selection bias was mitigated by randomly selecting
participants from a pool of qualified participants. There was reason to assume that
participants selected for the experiment are different from other employees within an
organization, since particular cyber professionals were sought (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009).
Having a person who is not specifically aware of the methods being tested select the
participants for the experiment may control the potential for selection bias. Blackwell and
Hodges (1957) states that selection bias may be eliminated by conducting the experiment
in a way that the person involved in selecting the participants is not aware of the
treatment methods.
The potential for experimental mortality is also a potential threat to the validity of
this study. Mortality refers to the loss of participants throughout the study, which may
increase the difficulty of comparing the data collected across each group of participants
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Since there were three phases requiring participant input,
there is an increased likelihood that participants may withdraw from the study. The
potential threat to participant withdrawal from the study was addressed by incentivizing
participants to partake within each phase of the study. The validity and reliability of the
developed prototype is pertinent to the overall study, thus, mitigation steps were taken
throughout this study to reduce potential threats. Taking potential threats into
consideration and using validated methods during the research design and development
may reduce threats to validity and reliability (Ellis & Levy, 2010).
Prototype Perceived Effectiveness

82
Once QUICK.v™ has been developed the effectiveness was determined. In phase
one, cyber visualization variables were obtained from at least 30 SMEs. Then in phase
two the applied visualization techniques were validated using at least 30 SMEs. SME
level of satisfaction and the value pertaining to the identified cyber visualization variables
and applied visualization techniques were measured in phase three. Identifying the
applicability of the cyber visualization variables within the final visualization was
pertinent for potentially standardizing cybersecurity visualization vital signs. Rating the
measure of value was deemed more beneficial than ranking characteristics, as this allows
participants to denote characteristics of equal value if one did not out weight the other
(Levy, 2004).
The System Usability Scale (SUS) is one of the most widely used questionnaires
to measure perceived usability or user satisfaction (Lewis & Sauro, 2009). SUS allows
usability practitioners to quickly and easily assess the usability of a given product or
service (Bangor, Kortum, & Miller, 2008). However, SUS was designed to form a
unidimensional measure of perceived usability (Borsci, Federici, Bacci, Gnaldi, &
Bartolucci, 2015). Sauro (2015) used SUS to measure the convergent validity of user
experiences on over 100 websites. Though some have found SUS to be a bidimensional
measure, it has been focused on usability and learnability (Borsci et al., 2015). Lewis and
Sauro (2017) performed an analysis of over 9,000 reports that utilized SUS, and found
that the bidimensional measure of SUS was not useful. Thus, while SUS has been found
to be an effective measure of usability or user satisfaction this measure primarily focuses
on user satisfaction and negates the evaluation of cognitive value or level of importance
when determining perceived effectiveness. Levy (2006) denoted that the complete
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measurement of IS effectiveness must include measures of the causal factors or ‘values’
as well as the end result construct or ‘user satisfaction’ (p. 60). As a result this study
determined perceived effectiveness using the effectiveness grid that denotes the
effectiveness curves and the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid (Levy, 2006).
Since SUS does not measure value and satisfaction only statements from SUS was
also applied within this study. Bangor et al. (2008) identified that 90% of SUS statements
when utilized have been modified to compare and better understand their data since the
scores from the utilized SUS statements provide a baseline score of usability.
Consequentially, Bangor et al. (2008) validated the use of modified SUS statements in
studies over several years, and found that modifications to SUS provide an adjective
rating that correlates with a given score, and provides details of what constitutes as an
acceptable SUS score. For the purpose of this study, the SUS statements depicted in
Table 8 was modified and utilized in Appendix C.
Table 8
Modified SUS Statements
Original SUS Statements
I thought the system was easy to use
I found that the various functions in this
system were well integrated
I found the system unnecessarily complex
I felt very confident using the system
I thought that there was too much
inconsistency in this system

Modified SUS Statements
Ease of use of information depicted
Various variables were well integrated
Complexity based on variables presented
Confidence quickly deciphering potential
insider threats
Consistency of visualizations presented

The perceived effectiveness of the prototype was determined using a combination
of value and satisfaction in order to indicate the magnitude of the prototype effectiveness
(Levy, 2006; Dooley, Hackney, Dooley, Levy, & Parrish, 2015; Levy, Hackney, &
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Parrish, 2017). By allowing SMEs to evaluate the final product SMEs can denote the
perceived effectiveness and potential value of QUICK.v™. The feedback and results
were analyzed to determine the viability of QUICK.v™ and suggested features for future
iterations.

Population and Sample
The study evaluated cyber visualization variables presented by at least 30 cyber
analysts that were used to develop QUICK.v™. The unit of analysis for this study was
the individual cyber analysts. The selected group of SMEs may also include cyber
analytics as well as cyber forensics professionals. These SMEs were solicited specifically
as the sample population for this study. A non-probability purposive judgment sampling
method was applied. Professionals whom are willing to participate in the data collection
were utilized to perform this study. Judgment sampling would be best applied to this
research since individuals with knowledge or experience within cybersecurity and have
utilized analytics tools may be in the best position to provide the information sought. This
is a viable sampling method when there is only a small subset of people who possess the
information needed to perform the research (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). Cyber, cyber
analytics, and cyber forensics professionals would be best suited for this study since they
are more likely to be familiar with the threats malicious insiders pose, the analytics tools
available and the difficulties faced when accurately detecting malicious activities within
cybersecurity. A small subset of highly skilled individuals will have the identified skill
set (Evans & Reeder, 2010).
Data Collection
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Data collection was conducted using a series of three instruments. In phase one,
data collection consisted of a qualitative survey instrument, to identify the critical cyber
visualization variables (Appendix A). In phase two, data collection consisted of a
qualitative survey instrument, to identify the criteria for visualization design (Appendix
B). Lastly, in phase three data was collected using a quantitative survey instrument, to
identify the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ (Appendix C). Since data collection,
analysis, and result reporting go hand in hand, accuracy of data collection was pertinent
(Elo, Kaariainen, Kanste, Polkki, Utriainen, & Kyngas, 2014). To ensure accurate data is
collected and that there are no missing or extreme data values pre-analysis data screening
was performed (Mertler, & Vannatta 2005). This aided in ensuring accuracy when the
data analysis is actually performed. Data collection was preformed on a sample of
identified cybersecurity and visualization SMEs within a controlled environment. A
controlled environment was utilized to allow for transcription during the data collection
process.
Data Analysis
Analysis results were applied to the development of QUICK.v™. Data collection
was based on both literature and input from at least 20 SMEs. This study seeks to answer
research question one and research question two by using SME input. Research question
three was answered using literature review and research question four was answered
using a combination of both SEM input as well as literature review. Research question
five was also answered based on SME provided input. Qualitative data analysis was also
utilized on the dataset in phase one and two. Qualitative and quantitative data analysis
was performed on this data set in phase three to obtain the rated effectiveness and
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feedback in relation to each rating. Since the development of QUICK.v™ was dependent
upon the cyber visualization variables identified by the SMEs. The visualization
techniques used to develop QUICK.v™ are the moderating variables for the developed
display. For phase one, qualitative data analysis-using coding was applied to identify the
cyber visualization variables based on the SME surveys. For phase two, statistical data
analysis was also conducted to determine the relevant visualization techniques by
identifying the relevant means.
In phase three the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was quantified based on
research analysis. The perceived effectiveness was determined using the effectiveness
grid that denotes the effectiveness curves and the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
(Levy, 2006). Within the effectiveness grid the mean satisfaction scores are on the
horizontal axis while the mean value scores are on the vertical axis (see Figure 10). Based
on Levy (2006) the calculation of satisfaction was performed by determining the mean
satisfaction characteristic: 𝑆!! , … 𝑆!!! , 𝑆!! , 𝑆!! , 𝑆!! , 𝑆!! . The equation that was used to
compute the mean satisfaction is:
!/!

!

𝑆!! =

𝐴!_!"#
!!!

!

Here, 𝐴!_!"# is the satisfaction score rated by SME 𝑖 for cyber visualization variable 𝐴! ,
and 𝑛 the number of cases that the data was collected. The aggregated value score noted
as 𝑉!! , … 𝑉!!! , 𝑉!! , … 𝑉!! , 𝑉!! , … 𝑉!! . The equation the was used to calculate the mean
value is:
!/!

!

𝑉!! =

𝐴!_!"#
!!!

!
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The 𝐴!_!"# is the characteristic value score rated by SME 𝑖 for cyber visualization
variable 𝐴! , and 𝑛 the number of cases that the data was collected (p. 184-185). Levy
(2006) developed the learners value and satisfaction (LeVIS) index in order to indicate
the perceived effectiveness of e-learning systems. The LeVIS index provides an overall
score of the magnitude of effectiveness for the developed prototype. Thus, this study
calculated the perceived effectiveness using the LeVIS index. Based on the LeVIS index
the perceived effectiveness would be determined using the formula below.
1
∗ 𝑉! ∗ 𝑆! → 0 ≤ 𝐿𝑒𝑉𝐼𝑆 ≤ 1
𝑛

Figure 10: Effectiveness Curves & Grid
(Levy, 2006)
Pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data collected prior to fully
analyzing the data. Pre-analysis data screening was performed to prevent data collection
issues (Levy & Ellis, 2006). The perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was dependent
upon the SMEs ratings of satisfaction and importance. Multiple regression analysis may
be used for data analysis. Multiple regression analysis is widely used because of its
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applicability, robustness as well as ease of interpretation and may provide a baseline for
evaluating empirical results (Mason, & Perreault, 1991).
An additional level of analysis was performed on QUICK.v™ to assess the
usability. The modified SUS statements utilized in Appendix C was extracted for
evaluation, based on the adjective rating that correlates with a given score, and correlated
to an acceptable SUS score. The SMEs satisfaction rating for each item was isolated for
this analysis. Each score was mapped to a mean rating and quartile. A SUS score of 70 or
above was deemed as acceptable (Bangor et al., 2008). As depicted in Table 9 each
adjective from Appendix C is mapped to a mean quartile. Once the rating is obtained
from SMEs the SUS score and acceptability can be determined as outlined in Figure 11.
Table 9
Mapping Adjective Rating to Study Mean Quartiles
No.

Adjective

M

Upper
Bound

Quartile

7

Extremely Satisfied

100

100

4

6

Very Satisfied

85.58

87.5

3

5

Satisfied

72.75

75.0

2

Mapping Adjective Rating to Study Mean Quartiles (continued)
No.

Adjective

M

Upper Bound

Quartile

4

Neutral

52.01

55.0

1

3

Unsatisfied

39.17

2

Very Unsatisfied

NA

1

Extremely Unsatisfied

25
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Note. NA= Not applicable

Figure 11: SUS Score by Quartile, Adjective Rating, and
Acceptability (Bangor et al., 2008)

Resources
This study may require Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval since human
participants was involved when testing the developed prototypes. Cybersecurity and
visualization SMEs need to be obtained for applying the Delphi method for SME input.
An HTML5 developer was utilized to develop the final prototype which required a
website and hosting to allow easy access from the web. In addition this study also
required obtaining parsed feeds of simulated data sets, this was housed in an AWS
database. Access to a mobile device or computer was needed for presenting the
developed visualization. Finally, ten $10 gift cards were needed to provide to the SMEs
as a reward for their contributions to this study.

Summary
In this chapter an overview of the research methodology utilized for this study
was provided. This study used a mixed methods approach, thus, quantitative and
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qualitative data was incorporated to develop, validate, and test the perceived
effectiveness of a newly designed prototype that aided in identifying anomalous activities
of malicious cyber insiders. The research questions that was addressed are:
1. What are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious
insider cyber threats?
2. What is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat
dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber
insider activities?
3. What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the predesignated critical
cyber visualization variables that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
4. What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious
cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
5. What is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction &
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating
potentially malicious cyber insider threats?
To address the research questions, the research methodology was applied over
three phases. In phase one, an exploratory study was performed to identify the criteria
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needed for displaying complex data correlations and visualization techniques extensive
literature analysis is required for the foundation of the research. In phase two, an
experimental study was performed to identify the criteria or user requirements for the
visualization design. In phase three, qualitative data analysis was performed on data
collected via an experiment to determine the perceived effectiveness or usability of the
developed prototype. Obtaining a SUS score also provided a very useful metric for the
overall prototype usability (Bangor et al., 2008). Survey instruments were utilized in
each phase to obtain applicable data, which was applied to the developed prototype. A
survey instrument was developed to identify the cyber visualization variables SMEs. A
qualitative survey instrument was developed to identify the visualization techniques for
the identified cyber visualization variables obtained from instrument one.
A prototype was developed based on the results of the data obtained from both
instruments. Lastly, an instrument was utilized to determine the perceived effectiveness
of the develop prototype. The population samples consisted of cybersecurity and
visualization SMEs. The chapter concluded with an overview of the resources that were
utilized in completing this experimental study.

92

Chapter 4
Results
Overview
Upon completion of the data collection process the methods of statistical analysis
and the data analysis process utilized are included in this chapter. In phase one, the
results are presented based on the data collection using SMEs and applying the Delphi
Method to identify and rank the most critical cyber visualization variables. Then, the
results from phase one are presented. In phase two, data collection is performed using
SMEs by applying the Delphi Method to validate the identified visualization techniques
and the techniques most valid for presenting complex cyber data. In phase three, the data
analysis and process used to determine the perceived effectiveness of QUICK.v™ was
completed. Based on data collection performed using SMEs, the identified value and
satisfaction for the developed prototype QUICK.v™ was attained. Presented at the end of
this chapter is the summary of the results for all three phases.

Phase One - Expert Panel
Initial data collection compromised of data collected from cybersecurity SMEs.
For phase one of this study, using the Delphi Method data collection was conducted early
January 2018 to late February 2018. The following sections present the data collection
process for phase one.
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Phase One – Data Collection
For phase one of this study, the goal for the SMEs was to identify the critical
cyber visualization variables that should be displayed when using applications to detect
potentially malicious insider cyber threats. Prior to the initial survey a pilot was
performed with five SMEs to verify the reliability of the data. Pilot studies are important
for trying out the research instrument as this could identify points where the proposed
instrument may be complicated or fail (Teijlingen & Hundley, 2001). The survey was
then refined and the final instrument used for phase one is presented in Appendix E. The
SMEs consisted of 300 cybersecurity professionals. These individuals were sourced from
LinkedIn social network. They included individuals in academia, public, and private
sector companies. Individuals in this group were located in the U.S., Europe, and India.
These individuals were selected as described in chapter three. An email presented in
Appendix D containing a link to a Web-based survey tool was used to record the
responses of the SMEs. A total of 42 SMEs completed the phase one survey. Upon
completing the survey another round of data collection for the identified variables was
performed with eight SMEs, additional qualitative data was captured in relation to each
variable and their selections.
Phase One – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Prior to data analysis pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data
collected from the SMEs. As noted by Mertler and Vannatta (2005), to ensure accurate
data is collected and that there are no missing or extreme data values pre-analysis data
screening needs to be performed. Levy and Ellis (2006) also denoted pre-analysis data
screening needs to be performed to prevent data collection issues. SME responses were
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collected using the Web-based tool SurveyMonkey®, which technically ensure
completeness by impeding impartial survey submissions. As a result, none of the surveys
submitted were excluded. Upon performing pre-analysis data screening no outliers were
identified or excluded, thus, all 42 responses collected were complete and included in the
data analysis.
Phase One - Expert Panel Characteristics
For phase one, the SMEs were solicited from LinkedIn professional contacts. A
survey was then distributed via email to collect responses. A total of 42 SMEs responded
by completing survey instrument one. This survey consisted of questions concerning the
identification of potentially malicious cyber insiders by identifying relevant cyber
visualization variables. Respondents were then asked to identify relevant demographic
information. Demographic information requested from the SMEs included gender and
age. To identify the expertise level of the SMEs they were asked to identify the number
of professional certifications they currently hold between zero and five or more
certifications. The level of education of the SMEs was also identified. SMEs were to
identify themselves as holding a 2-year college (Associates degree), a 4-year college
(Bachelors degree), a Graduate degree, or a Doctorate.
SMEs were also asked to identify their experience within their current roles based
on the number of years they have worked within their current organizations. They were
able to select from under one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15 years, 16 to
20 years, and over 30 years. SMEs were to identify themselves as working within
academia, federal government, private sector, sate government, or other. SMEs were
asked to identify their job function within cybersecurity. Finally, the SMEs were asked to
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describe their current employer by identifying which role described their current
employer. Table 10 represents the complete SME demographic distributions based on
their responses.
Table 10
Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (N= 42)
Frequency

Percentage
(%)

Female
Male

4
38

9.5%
90.5%

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59

11
13
13
5

26.2%
31.0%
31.0%
11.9%

0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

17
9
3
4
3
6

40.5%
21.4%
7.1%
9.5%
7.1%
14.3%

2-year college (Associates degree)
4-year college (Bachelors degree)
Graduate degree
Doctorate

1
18
19
4

2.4%
42.9%
45.2%
9.5%

Under 1 year
1 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
Over 30 years

7
23
6
2
3
1

20.0%
65.7%
17.1%
5.7%
8.6%
2.9%

Academia
Federal government employee
Private sector company
State government employee
Other

5
4
29
1
3

11.9%
9.5%
69.0%
2.4%
7.1%

Gender
Age
Category

Certification

Education

Experience

Employer
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Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (continued)
Frequency

Percentage
(%)

1
1
2
15
4
1
1
4
1
12

2.4%
2.4%
4.8%
35.7%
9.5%
2.4%
2.4%
9.5%
2.4%
28.6%

Job Function
Cybersecurity Administrator
Cybersecurity Analyst
Cybersecurity Architect
Cybersecurity Consultant
Cybersecurity Engineer
Information Assurance Engineer
Information Security Analyst
Information Security Manager
Network Security Engineer
Other
Phase One – Data Analysis
In phase one, the data collected was exported to Microsoft Excel for initial
analysis. Answers to each survey question were parsed to identify the count of each
variable selected by the SMEs. In survey one the variables within each individual
category were first assessed by the SMEs. To address RQ1, what are SMEs' identified
critical cyber visualization variables that should be displayed when using applications to
detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats? SMEs were asked to select the relevant
analytic variable within each identified category that they deem to be most important
when trying to identify potentially malicious insider threats. The categories of analytic
variables individually assessed include: System, Social, Health, Human Resources,
Financial, Security, and Criminal.
Since the SMEs were asked to select at most two analytic variables for each
category, the variables were weighted based on their selection for analysis. If the SME
did not deem a variable as critical, they did not have to select a variable within that
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category. Thus, some variables were not selected and had a count of zero. The count or
number of responses pertaining to the particular variable represents the total instances
that an analytic variable was selected as a response for variable one and variable two
within each category. If the variable was selected as variable one or variable two, this
selection was then weighted to obtain the weighted average ranking for that variable. The
total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of the 42
participants had the option of selecting two variables per question. The weighted average
ranking was then converted to a percentage to represent the final ranking of the
applicable variable within its category. For instance, in Table 11 for the analytic variable
‘access inconsistent with user class’, the count of SME selection for variable one was
eight, while the count for variable two was also eight, resulting in a total ‘Count’ of
sixteen. The eight selections for variable one and two were subsequently weighted, with
variable one being given a higher weight than variable two. The weighted average
ranking for the variable was then determined by using the weight of ranked position (w),
multiplied by the response count (x), as depicted in the formula below.
𝑥! 𝑤! + 𝑥! 𝑤!
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
Once the weighted average ranking for all variables within the category was determined,
the applicable percentage for that raking in relation to all variables were determined. This
was performed for each variable within the category. Subsequently, the same steps were
performed for each individual analytic variable category.
In this study, system analytic variables refer to system generated events based on
event logs. System event logs generally portray system, user, and network activity. These
logs are generated by the server operating system, firewall, or other applications within
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an organizations environment (Girardin & Brodbeck, 1998). Audit logs contain a detailed
trace of an operating system (Yoo, Jo, Kim, & Seo, 2018). From these logs observations
relevant to user behavior can be made. The system analytic variables below reflect types
of observations a cybersecurity analyst can make based on the event logs. Table 11
represents the final weight allocation for the system analytic variables based on SME
responses.
Table 11
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant System Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
System - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Access Inconsistent With User Class
16
19%
Changes in Data Access Patterns
12
16%
Privilege Change
10
14%
Authentication and Authorization Failure
9
14%
Data Exfiltration
7
12%
Unauthorized Data Access Methods
13
8%
Audit Log Modification
6
7%
Knowledge Access
2
4%
Network Patterns Inconsistent with User Class
4
3%
Improper Command Usage
1
2%
Changes in Network Patterns
1
1%
Erroneous Defensive Posture Changes
0
0%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, facility analytic variables refer to event logs generated in relation to
aspects of physical access. The times that a user enters or leaves a facility. This data is
generally logged and monitored. Using logs that show physical movement via the system
access control systems can aid in the detection of malicious insiders (Sanders, 2017).
Access times and locations are vital to protecting cybersecurity systems within an
organization (Denning & MacDoran, 1996). The facility analytic variables below reflect
types of observations a cybersecurity analyst can make based on these event logs. Table
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12 represents the final weight allocation for the facility analytic variables based on SME
responses.
Table 12
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Facility Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
Facility - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Time of Access Pattern Changes
39
71%
Locality of Access Pattern Changes
41
29%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the business capability analytic variables refer to aspects of an
organizations business model that define their business capabilities. Business capabilities
are generally focused on people, process, and technology within the organization
Rosemann & vom Brocke, 2015). By integrating, monitoring and analyzing a vast
amount of dispersed event logs organizations can monitor and analyze the performance of
their business processes (Vera-Baquero, Colomo Palacios, Stantchev, & Molloy, 2015).
The business capability analytic variables below reflect types of observations a
cybersecurity analyst can make based on relevant business capability events. Table 13
represents the final weight allocation for the business capability analytic variables based
on SME responses.
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Table 13
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Business Capability Analytic Variables Selected
(N= 42)
Business Capability - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Malware Deployment
16
35%
Failure Correlation
11
24%
Attribution of Disclosure
5
18%
Analysis of Competitor
4
12%
Retrieval
8
8%
Analysis of Public Media
3
3%
Deletion or Modification of Data or Infrastructure
0
0%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the social analytic variables refer to aspects of a users behavior or
relevant human factors. Negative attitudes toward business activities and impulsivity can
be correlated with risky cybersecurity behaviors (Hadlington, 2017). Monitoring human
factors in cybersecurity is important, if ignored these factors can place an organization at
risk. Since social analytic variables does not generally have data available within event
logs or SIEM solutions. This data may be identified using dictionary languages with
theme-specific dictionaries that contain a list of words that have been validated to be
associated with constructs. These constructs may include wellbeing, engagement, positive
and negative emotion, power, etc. In the future this data may be collected from employee
email, social media, or instant messenger content (Shami, Muller, Pal, Masli, & Geyer,
2015). The social analytic variables below reflect types of observations a cybersecurity
analyst can make based on relevant social events. Table 14 represents the final weight
allocation for the social analytic variables based on SME responses.
Table 14
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Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Social Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
Social - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Unauthorized or Inappropriate Associations
23
37%
Personal Inflexibility
7
12%
Workplace Satisfaction
11
10%
Disregard
6
10%
Unusual Contacts
10
8%
Unusual Business Travel
7
8%
Unusual Personal Travel
3
7%
Withdrawal
8
5%
Workplace Events
4
3%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the health analytic variables refer to aspects of a users behavior or
relevant human factors. Human factors contribute to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and
risks (Hadlington, 2017). Instability and impulsivity can impact a users tendency toward
malicious activities (King, Henshel, Flora, Cains, Hoffman, & Sample, 2018). The health
analytic variables below reflect types of observations a cybersecurity analyst can make
based on relevant health events. Table 15 represents the final weight allocation for the
health analytic variables based on SME responses.
Table 15
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Health Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
Health - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Mental instability
40
62%
Impulse Control
43
38%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the human resource analytic variables refer to events obtained via
human resources (HR). Generally, HR representatives track and monitor complaints or
review data pertaining to a user. Human characteristics can be correlated with
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cybersecurity behaviors, this data can be utilized to identify cybersecurity events
(Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, & Ginther, 2018). The HR analytic variables below
reflect types of observations that can be made based on relevant HR events. Table 16
represents the final weight allocation for the health analytic variables based on SME
responses.
Table 16
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Human Resource Analytic Variables Selected
(N= 42)
Human Resources - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Complaints Against the User
37
45%
Major Life Event
18
31%
Negative Reviews
27
24%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the financial analytic variables refer to events related to a users
financial means. A users financial means or changes to those means can affect users
cybersecurity related activities. With changes in means a user can generally be tied to
fraudulent insider activities (Westerlund, Craigen, Bailetti, & Agwae, 2018). The
financial analytic variables below reflect types of observations that can be made based on
relevant financial events. Table 17 represents the final weight allocation for the financial
analytic variables based on SME responses.
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Table 17
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Financial Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
Financial - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Observed Change in Means Relative to Peers
25
36%
Observed Temporal Change in Means
26
33%
Financial Reporting
28
31%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the security analytic variables refer to user activities that trigger
security related events. Security analytic variables are generally identified using event
logs. An organization may identify specific triggers for what constitutes a security event.
For the purpose of this study examples of security events may include: software
installation, managing system services, or successful and failed login attempts (Malec,
Piwowar, Kozakiewicz, & Lasota, 2015). The security analytic variables below reflect
types of observations that can be made based on relevant security events. Table 18
represents the final weight allocation for the security analytic variables based on SME
responses.
Table 18
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Security Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
Security - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Unauthorized or Inappropriate Use of Tools
33
58%
Duration and Regularity of Security Events
23
27%
Change in Violation Patterns
23
15%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
In this study, the criminal analytic variables refer to events related to a users
criminal activity. Criminal activities may contribute to a users cybersecurity related
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activities. (Chang, Zhong, & Grabosky, 2018). The criminal analytic variables below
reflect types of observations that can be made based on relevant criminal events. Table 19
represents the final weight allocation for the criminal analytic variables based on SME
responses.
Table 19
Weight Allocations for the Two Relevant Criminal Analytic Variables Selected (N= 42)
Criminal - Analytic Variables
Count
%
Recent Increase in Criminal Events
28
40%
Violence Outside Workplace
25
25%
Wage Garnishments
15
25%
Restraining Orders
9
10%
Note. The total count or maximum number of potential responses was 84, since each of
the 42 participants had the option of selecting two variables per question.
Critical Cyber Visualization Variables Rank Order
Research question two asked: what is the rank order of the SMEs' identified
critical cyber visualization variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber
insider threat dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber
insider activities? To address it, in survey instrument one, SMEs were presented with all
45 analytic variables. They were then asked to think of issues related to the insider threat
detection and list only the top five variables that are the most important to them when
identifying malicious insider threats. From the SMEs weighted rankings the identified top
six critical cyber visualization variables were: workplace satisfaction, change in violation
patterns, audit log modification, change in data access patterns, data exfiltration, and
privilege change. Table 20 presents the resulting rank order for all critical cyber
visualization variables based on SME responses.
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Table 20
Final Weighted Rankings for all Analytic Variables Selected as the Top Five Most
Critical When Identifying Potentially Malicious Insider Threats
Analytic Variables
Social-Workplace Satisfaction
Security-Change in Violation Patterns
System-Audit Log Modification
System-Changes in Data Access Patterns
System-Data Exfiltration
System-Privilege Change
Business Capabilities-Malware Deployment
Human Resources-Negative Reviews
System-Authentication and Authorization Failure
System-Unauthorized Data Access Methods
Facility-Time of Access Pattern Changes
Facility-Locality of Access Pattern Changes
Criminal-Recent Increase in Criminal Events
System-Access Inconsistent With User Class
Criminal-Violence Outside Workplace
System-Changes in Network Patterns
Criminal-Wage Garnishments
Human Resources-Complaints Against the User
System-Knowledge Access
Social-Unauthorized or Inappropriate Associations
Business Capabilities-Deletion or Modification of Data
or Infrastructure
Business Capabilities-Failure Correlation
Social-Disregard
Social-Workplace Events
Human Resources-Major Life Event
Security-Duration and Regularity of Security Events
System-Network Patterns Inconsistent with User Class
Security-Unauthorized or Inappropriate Use of Tools
Business Capabilities-Analysis of Public Media
Social-Unusual Business Travel
Social-Unusual Personal Travel
Social-Withdrawal
Criminal-Restraining Orders

Weighted
Mean
4.00
4.00
3.82
3.80
3.70
3.69
3.60
3.60
3.45
3.36
3.29
3.00
3.00
2.78
2.67
2.50
2.40
2.25
2.20
2.17

Final
Rank
1
1
3
4
5
6
7
7
9
10
11
12
12
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2.10
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.50
1.50
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

21
22
22
22
22
22
27
27
29
29
29
29
29
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Analytic Variable Final Weighted Rankings (continued)
Analytic Variables
System-Improper Command Usage
System-Erroneous Defensive Posture Changes
Business Capabilities-Attribution of Disclosure
Business Capabilities-Analysis of Competitor
Business Capabilities-Retrieval
Social-Personal Inflexibility
Social-Unusual Contacts
Social-Mental instability
Social-Impulse Control
Human Resources-Observed Change in Means Relative
to Peers
Human Resources-Observed Temporal Change in Means
Human Resources-Financial Reporting

Weighted
Mean
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Final
Rank
34
34
34
34
34
34
34
34
34

0.00
0.00
0.00

34
34
34

Phase One - Comments
No exclusions were identified within the 42 completed surveys. In survey
instrument one, SMEs where asked to comment on the positives and negatives associated
with their identified top five critical cyber visualization variables. Commenting was not
required for these questions. The responses received were relatively consistent and
general in nature. For the positives associated with the top five critical cyber visualization
variables similar comments suggested the variables identified would: be a good indicator
of a potential problem, allow for a quicker way to pin-point an issue, and assist with
quicker resolutions to detected serious violations. The negatives associated with the top
six critical cyber visualization variables identified by the SMEs suggested: identified
violations based on the variables should be considered in context, false positives may
persist as an issue, and that some data may be difficult for an employer to obtain. In
addition to the comments within the survey the focus group was contacted for additional
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validation of the data collected. Comments from the focus group aligned with the
comments obtained within survey instrument one as a result no further additions or
collection was needed.
Phase Two - Expert Panel
Initial data collection compromised of data collected from cybersecurity and
visualization SMEs. For phase two of this study, using the Delphi Method data collection
was conducted mid-March 2018 to late March 2018. The following sections present the
data collection process for phase two.
Phase Two – Data Collection
For phase two of this study, the goal for the SMEs was to identify the
visualization techniques that are most valid to present the top five critical cyber
visualization variables. Also, to identify the visualization techniques that are most valid
to present complex cyber data correlations. Prior to the initial survey, a pilot was
performed with three SMEs to verify the survey’s ability to collect appropriate data. The
survey was then refined and the final instrument used for phase two is presented in
Appendix G. The SMEs consisted of 80 cybersecurity and visualization professionals,
these individuals were sourced from the SME demographic information collected in
phase one. SMEs with higher levels of expertise were invited to participate. Additional
SMEs were added to the list from the initial 300 participants identified for phase one,
based on certification and job function data on their LinkedIn profiles. The SMEs for
phase two included individuals in academia, public, and private sector companies.
Individuals in this group were located primarily in the U.S. An invitation was sent to each
participant to complete the Google Forms® presented in Appendix F. A total of 31 SMEs
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completed the survey in this round. Upon completing the survey another round of data
collection for the identified variables was performed with six SMEs from the focus
group, additional qualitative data was captured in relation to each variable and their
selections.
Phase Two – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Prior to data analysis pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data
collected from the SMEs. SME responses were collected using the Web-based tool
Google Forms®, this tool allowed for technical restrictions to form submissions without
completing all questions. This ensured completeness by impeding impartial survey
submissions. As a result and given no missing data existed, none of the surveys submitted
were excluded. Upon performing pre-analysis data screening no outliers were identified
or excluded. The 31 responses collected were all included for data analysis.
Phase Two - Expert Panel Characteristics
For phase two, the SMEs were solicited from the researches LinkedIn
professional contacts. A survey was then distributed via email to collect responses. A
total of 31 SMEs responded by completing survey instrument two. This survey consisted
of questions concerning the identification of visualization techniques to present top five
critical cyber visualization variables and to present complex cyber data correlations.
Respondents were asked to identify relevant demographic information. Demographic
information requested from the SMEs included gender and age. To identify the expertise
level of the SMEs they were asked to identify the number of professional certifications
they currently hold between zero to five or more certifications. The level of education of
the SMEs was also identified. SMEs were to identify themselves as holding a 2-year
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college (Associates degree), a 4-year college (Bachelors degree), a Graduate degree
(MA/MS), or a Doctorate.
Additionally, SMEs were asked to identify their experience within their current
roles based on the number of years they have worked within their current organizations.
They were able to select from under one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15
years, 16 to 20 years, and over 30 years. The SMEs were asked to describe their current
employer by identifying which role described their current employer. They were to
identify themselves as working within academia, federal government, private sector, sate
government, or other. SMEs were asked to identify their job function within
cybersecurity. Table 21 represents the demographic distribution of their responses.
Table 21
Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (N= 31)
Frequency

%

Female
Male

6
25

19.4%
80.6%

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59

12
10
5
4

38.7%
32.3%
16.1%
12.9%

0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

9
8
6
1
1
6

29.0%
25.8%
19.4%
3.2%
3.2%
19.4%

2-year college (Associates degree)
4-year college (Bachelors degree)
Graduate degree (MA/MS)
Doctorate

1
18
12
0

3.2%
58.1%
38.7%
0.0%

Gender
Age Category

Certification

Education
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Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (continued)
Frequency

%

Under 1 year
1 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
Over 30 years

10
16
1
3
0
1

47.6%
76.2%
4.8%
14.3%
0.0%
4.8%

Academia
Federal government employee
Private sector company
State government employee
Other

5
2
1
1
22

16.1%
6.5%
3.2%
3.2%
71.0%

Cybersecurity Administrator
Cybersecurity Analyst
Cybersecurity Architect
Cybersecurity Consultant
Cybersecurity Engineer
Information Assurance Engineer
Information Security Analyst
Information Security Manager
Network Security Engineer
Other

1
0
2
14
6
0
0
4
0
4

3.2%
0.0%
6.5%
45.2%
19.4%
0.0%
0.0%
12.9%
0.0%
12.9%

Experience

Employer

Job Function

Phase Two – Data Analysis
In phase two the data collected was converted to Excel for initial analysis,
answers to each survey question were parsed to identify the count of each variable
selected by the SMEs. The visualization technique for each of the SMEs' identified
critical cyber visualization variable were first assessed. RQ3 asked: what SMEs’
identified visualization techniques are most valid to present complex cyber data
correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical cyber visualization variables that are
applied within the developed cyber visualization prototype QUICK.v™? To address
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RQ3, SMEs were presented with three options of visualization techniques identified for
presenting complex data correlations. They were then asked to select the visualization
technique from the three options presented that are most relevant to displaying two or
more data variables. RQ4 four asked: what SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are
most valid to present top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially
malicious cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™? To address RQ4, SMEs were presented with three
options of visualization techniques identified for presenting each of the six critical cyber
visualization variables. Based on the data analysis results from phase one, since six
critical cyber visualization variables were identified, survey two was modified to add six
critical cyber visualization variables. SMEs were asked to select the visualization
technique from the three options presented that are most relevant to displaying data
related to each of the six critical cyber visualization variables.
Since the SMEs were asked to select one option for each visualization technique
presented the responses were not weighted prior to determining the final allocations. All
questions were also marked are requiring a response, as a result SMEs had to select a
visualization technique for each of the critical cyber visualization variables. Table 22
through Table 27 represent the final rankings for the present top six critical cyber
visualization variables. Based on the count (n), the average for each visualization
technique was identified. This was performed on all data collected for each of the six
critical cyber visualization variables, allowing for the identification of which
visualization techniques are most valid to present each of the top six critical cyber
visualization variables.
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Table 22
Visualization Technique Rankings (N= 31)
N

%

Line Graph
Bar Graph
Calendar View

16
13
2

52%
42%
6%

Area Chart
Radar Plot
Streamgraph

18
9
4

58%
29%
13%

Line Graph
Fisheye Distortion
Bar Graph

18
8
5

58%
26%
16%

Stacked Column Graph
Stacked Bar Graph
Streamgraph

18
12
1

58%
39%
3%

Data
Exfiltration

Line Graph
Column Graph
Fisheye Distortion

18
9
4

58%
29%
13%

Privilege
Change

Line Graph
Stacked Bars
Stacked Columns

16
14
1

52%
45%
3%

Complex Data
Correlations

Parallel Coordinates
Chord Diagram
Hierarchical Bundling

15
14
2

48%
45%
6%

Workplace
Satisfaction

Change in
Violation
Pattern

Audit Log
Modification

Change in
Data Access
Pattern

Phase Two – Comments
No exclusions were identified within the 31 completed surveys. In survey
instrument two, SMEs were not asked for comments. Since the identified list of SMEs
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consisted of 80 individuals, using the Delphi method the initial set of surveys were sent to
all 80 SMEs to complete on their own. Subsequently, survey instrument two was again
administered to eight SMEs of the focus group using a contrived setting allowed for
extensive control over the experiment. A virtual lab environment was used via Google
Hangout to obtain qualitative data from these SMEs. Consistent responses were received.
SMEs denoted though they were intrigued by the more creative visualization techniques
presented, they veered towards selecting the more standard methods that they are used in
other contexts and could easily make sense of. Another recurrent comment was, that
SMEs are often presented with dashboards that make no sense to them and found this to
be a good way to start standardization. All other comments were generally around data
within the visualizations, to which SMEs’ were then asked, for this survey to bring their
focus back on the visualization technique itself and not the data presented.

Phase Three – Expert Panel
Initial data collection compromised of data collected from cybersecurity and
visualization SMEs. For phase three of this study, data collection was conducted midApril 2018 to late April 2018. The following sections present the data collection process
for phase three.
Phase Three – Data Collection
In phase three of this study, the goal for the SMEs was to identify the perceived
effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & value/importance) of the developed prototype
QUICK.v™. Prior to the initial survey a pilot was performed with five SMEs to verify
the survey’s ability to collect appropriate data. The survey was then refined and the final
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instrument used for phase three is presented in Appendix I. The SMEs in this phase
consisted of 300 cybersecurity and visualization professionals. These individuals were
sourced from LinkedIn network. They included individuals in academia, public, and
private sector companies. Individuals in this group were located primarily in the U.S. and
India. An invitation was sent to each participant to complete the Google Forms®
presented in Appendix H. A total of 26 SMEs completed the survey.
Phase Three – Pre-Analysis Data Screening
Prior to data analysis pre-analysis data screening was performed on the data
collected from the SMEs. SME responses were collected using the Web-based tool
Google Forms®, this tool allowed for technical restrictions to form submissions without
completing all questions. This ensured completeness by impeding impartial survey
submissions. Upon performing pre-analysis data screening, an outlier was identified and
excluded from further analysis. No additional responses were excluded, thus from the 26
responses collected, 25 were included for data analysis.
Phase Three - Expert Panel Characteristics
For phase three, the SMEs were solicited from LinkedIn professional contacts. A
survey was then distributed via email to collect responses. A total of 26 SMEs responded
by completing survey instrument one was usable due to one outlier. This survey consisted
of questions to identify the level of satisfaction and the value for each of the top six
critical cyber visualization variables and presentation technique. Respondents were asked
to identify relevant demographic information. Demographic information requested from
the SMEs included gender and age. To identify the expertise level of the SMEs they were
asked to identify the number of professional certifications they currently hold between
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zero to five or more certifications. The level of education of the SMEs was also
identified. SMEs were to identify themselves as holding a 2-year college (Associates
degree), a 4-year college (Bachelors degree), a Graduate degree (MA/MS), or a
Doctorate.
Additionally, SMEs were asked to identify their experience within their current
roles based on the number of years they have worked within their current organizations.
They were able to select from under one year, one to five years, six to 10 years, 11 to 15
years, 16 to 20 years, and over 30 years. The SMEs were asked to describe their current
employer by identifying which role described their current employer. They were to
identify themselves as working within academia, federal government, private sector, sate
government, or other. SMEs were asked to identify their job function within
cybersecurity. Table 23 represents the demographic distribution of their responses.
Table 23
Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (N= 25)
Frequency

%

Female
Male

4
21

16.0%
84.0%

20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59

7
11
4
3

28.0%
44.0%
16.0%
12.0%

0
1
2
3
4
5 or more

9
8
3
2
1
2

36.0%
32.0%
12.0%
8.0%
4.0%
8.0%

Gender

Age Category

Certification
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Demographic Distribution of the SMEs (continued)
Frequency

%

2-year college (Associates degree)
4-year college (Bachelors degree)
Graduate degree (MA/MS)
Doctorate

2
10
11
2

8.0%
40.0%
44.0%
8.0%

Under 1 year
1 - 5 years
6 - 10 years
11 - 15 years
16 - 20 years
Over 30 years

3
13
3
4
2
0

13.6%
59.1%
13.6%
18.2%
9.1%
0.0%

Academia
Federal government employee
Private sector company
State government employee
Other

7
4
2
2
10

28.0%
16.0%
8.0%
8.0%
40.0%

Cybersecurity Administrator
Cybersecurity Analyst
Cybersecurity Architect
Cybersecurity Consultant
Cybersecurity Engineer
Information Assurance Engineer
Information Security Analyst
Information Security Manager
Network Security Engineer
Other

0
5
2
6
4
0
0
2
0
6

0.0%
20.0%
8.0%
24.0%
16.0%
0.0%
0.0%
8.0%
0.0%
24.0%

Education

Experience

Employer

Job Function

Phase Three – Data Analysis
In phase three the data collected was exported to Microsoft Excel for initial
analysis, answers to each survey question were parsed to identify the count of each
variable selected by the SMEs. The demographic data was first assessed. Next, the
descriptive analysis was prepared for the top six critical cyber visualization variables and
the variable for complex data correlations. Table 24 represents the summary for the
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calculated mean (M), percentage (%), and standard deviation (SD). Table 31 represents
the summary for the calculated mean (M), percentage (%), and standard deviation (SD)
for the value.
The level of satisfaction with variable one, workplace satisfaction had an average
of 5.20 with a min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with variable two,
change in violation patterns had an average of 4.92 with a min = 1.00 and max = 7.00.
The level of satisfaction with variable three, audit log modification had an average of
5.12 with a min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with variable four,
changes in data access patterns had an average of 5.28 with a min = 1.00 and max = 7.00.
The level of satisfaction with variable five, data exfiltration had an average of 5.40 with a
min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with variable six, privilege change
had an average of 5.60 with a min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The level of satisfaction with
complex cyber data correlations had an average of 4.96 with a min = 1.00 and max =
7.00.
The value of variable one, workplace satisfaction had an average of 5.92 with a
min = 2.00 and max = 7.00. The value of variable two, change in violation patterns had
an average of 6.12 with a min = 3.00 and max = 7.00. The value of variable three, audit
log modification had an average of 6.00 with a min = 3.00 and max = 7.00. The value of
variable four, changes in data access patterns had an average of 6.48 with a min = 5.00
and max = 7.00. The value of variable five, data exfiltration had an average of 6.52 with a
min = 5.00 and max = 7.00. The value of variable six, privilege change had an average of
6.24 with a min = 4.00 and max = 7.00. The value of complex cyber data correlations had
an average of 6.16 with a min = 3.00 and max = 7.00. Table 24 represents the descriptive
statistics for the critical cyber visualization variables.
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Table 24
Descriptive Statistics for Critical Cyber Visualization Variables (N=25)
Item

Value

Satisfaction

Variable 1: Workplace
Satisfaction
Variable 2: Change in
Violation Patterns
Variable 3: Audit Log
Modification
Variable 4: Changes in Data
Access Patterns
Variable 5: Data Exfiltration
Variable 6: Privilege
Change

M

SD

M

SD

5.20

1.38

5.92

1.22

4.92

1.80

6.12

1.13

5.12

1.39

6

1.08

5.28

1.62

6.48

0.77

5.40

1.58

6.52

0.71

5.60

1.44

6.24

1.01

Then the data for the level of satisfaction and the value was analyzed in order to
determine the respective perceived effectiveness. To address research question five, what
is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction & value/importance) of the
QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially malicious cyber insider threats? After
viewing the developed prototype QUICK.v™ SMEs’ were presented a 7-point Likerttype rating scale for satisfaction and value to assess for each stated item. Since the
statements within survey instrument three were not positively or negatively termed the
data was not reverse coded prior to analysis. The satisfaction and value/importance of
each item was calculated to then determine the perceived effectiveness using the LeVIS
index (Levy, 2006). Based on the LeVIS index the perceived effectiveness was
determined using the formula below. Where 49 is used as n to normalize the effectiveness
output. This is based on the maximum value and satisfaction scale being seven. Thus,
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seven multiplied seven by seven results in the value 49 used to determine the
effectiveness in the formula below.
1
1
∗ 𝑉! ∗ 𝑆! →
∗ 𝑉! ∗ 𝑆!
𝑛
49
Table 32 represents the perceived effectiveness (LeVIS Index) for all items based on the
SMEs responses.
Table 25
LeVIS Index Results for Perceived Effectiveness (N= 25)
Item
Variable 1: Workplace Satisfaction
Variable 2: Change in Violation Patterns
Variable 3: Audit Log Modification
Variable 4: Changes in Data Access Patterns
Variable 5: Data Exfiltration
Variable 6: Privilege Change
Complex Cyber Data Correlations
Type of Variables Presented
Interest in Variables Presented
Organization of Variables Presented
Complexity Based on Variables Presented
Various Variables Were Well Integrated
Relevance of Variables to Insider Threat
Detection
Quality of Visualizations
Organization of Visualizations Presented
Consistency of Visualizations Presented
Ability to Quickly Decipher Potential Insider
Threats
Confidence Quickly Deciphering Potential
Insider Threats
Ability to Make Actionable Decisions Based
on Information Depicted
Ease of Use of Information Depicted
Overall, how would you rate your level of
satisfaction/importance of QUICK.v™ when
identifying potentially malicious cyber
insiders?

Satisfaction
4.99
4.42
4.91
4.92
5.11
5.37
4.44
4.46
4.41
4.32
4.21
4.18

Value
5.75
6.00
5.89
6.43
6.48
6.15
6.05
5.58
5.70
5.55
5.44
5.37

LeVIS
Index
0.59
0.54
0.59
0.65
0.68
0.67
0.55
0.51
0.51
0.49
0.47
0.46

4.51

6.31

0.58

4.10
3.90
4.41

6.03
5.56
6.03

0.50
0.45
0.57

3.56

6.13

0.45

3.88

6.43

0.51

3.83

6.23

0.49

4.21

6.21

0.53

4.23

5.73

0.49
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Figure 12: Satisfaction and Value Distribution Summary

Figure 13: LeVIS Index Summary
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Additionally, the modified SUS statements were extracted for analysis. To
provide an adjective rating that correlates with the acceptable SUS score of 70 or above.
The extracted statements were not framed to alternate between positive and negative
statements. Thus, a raw SUS score was calculated based solely on the extracted five SUS
statements within survey instrument three. When statements alternate between the
positive and negative, care must be taken when scoring the survey (Bangor et al., 2008).
The SMEs satisfaction rating for each item was isolated for this analysis. The SUS score
was calculated by creating a sum from the items rather than a mean score, this allows for
analysis of the same variance as performed by Bangor et al. (2008). Table 26 represents
the SUS score for the five items based on all SMEs responses. Table 27 represents the
SUS quartile and its corresponding adjective rating based on all SMEs responses.

Table 26
SUS Scores (N=25)
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Table 27
SUS Score by Quartile, Adjective Rating, and Acceptability (N=25)

Participant
p1
p2
p3
p4
p5
p6
p7
p8
p9
p10
p11
p12
p13
p14
p15
p16
p17
p18
p19
p20
p21
p22
p23
p24
p25

Inflated Score
(adjusted to a range
of 0-100)
54.3
85.7
22.9
65.7
80.0
85.7
88.6
100.0
22.9
65.7
54.3
60.0
31.4
74.3
74.3
77.2
82.9
82.9
54.3
37.2
68.6
82.9
54.3
82.9
82.9

SUS Quartile
1
4
1
2
4
4
4
4
1
2
1
1
1
3
3
3
4
4
1
1
2
4
1
4
4

Adjective
Ok
Best Imaginable
Worst Imaginable
Good
Excellent
Best Imaginable
Best Imaginable
Best Imaginable
Worst Imaginable
Good
Good
Good
Poor
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Excellent
Good
Poor
Good
Excellent
Good
Excellent
Excellent

Phase Three - Comments
No exclusions were identified within the 25 completed surveys. In survey
instrument three, SMEs were not asked for comments within the survey. Since the
identified list of SMEs consisted of 300 individuals, the surveys were sent to all 300
SMEs to complete on their own. With phase one and two consisting of Delphi survey
instruments, by phase three there was an issue of non-response from many SMEs. It is
common within Delphi investigations to be unable achieve and maintain an ideal
response rate due to the characteristics of multiple iterations, the possible scarcity of
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qualified subjects, and the relatively small number of subjects used (Hsu, & Sandford,
2007, p. 1). As a result, only 25 completed surveys were received. From the 25 completed
surveys the results indicated each of the identified individual critical cyber visualization
variables were effective.

Summary of the Results
In phase one, when SMEs were asked to select the relevant variable that were
most important when identifying potentially malicious insider threats, the order in which
the variable was selected corresponded to a weight. The weight was used to identify the
most critical variable within the analytic variable category. For instance, changes in data
access pattern was identified as the second most critical system analytic category variable
though, the count equaled twelve. Unauthorized data access methods with the count equal
to thirteen, had a significantly lower ranking. Since, the count was equal to seven for
variable one which corresponded to changes in data access patterns. The count was equal
to three for variable one, unauthorized data access methods. The higher weighting of a
selection as variable one resulted in a higher weighted average ranking, consequently
increasing the final ranking for changes in data access patterns. Subsequently, in phase
one when SME’s were asked to select the relevant variable that is most important when
trying to identify potentially malicious insider threats within each individual category the
findings are as follows.
For the individual categories of system analytic variables, access inconsistent with
user class was identified as the most critical variable within this category. In each
individual category for facility analytic variables, time of access pattern changes was
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identified as the most critical variable within this category. Malware deployment was
identified as most critical for the individual category of business capability. Unauthorized
or inappropriate associations were identified as the critical visualization variable within
the social analytic individual category. For the health individual category, mental
instability was identified as a critical visualization variable. Complaints against the user
were identified as a critical visualization variable within the human resources individual
category. Observed change in means relative to peers was identified as a critical
visualization variable for the financial individual category. Unauthorized or inappropriate
use of tools was identified as the critical visualization variable for the security individual
category. For the criminal analytic variable recent increase in criminal events was
identified as the critical visualization variable. These finding vary from the identified
rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables.
When SMEs were given the full list of cyber visualization variables and asked to
consider only the top five variables important when identifying potentially malicious
insider threats, alternate variables were identified as being most critical. Outside the
context of an individual category, SMEs were able to truly focus on what was most
critical to them based on their experience. From the ranking of variables a corresponding
weight was applied to each variable. The weight was used to identify the top six most
critical variables. The identified critical cyber visualization variables were: workplace
satisfaction, change in violation patterns, audit log modification, changes in data access
patterns, and privilege change.
In phase two, once the SMEs identified and validated the top six critical cyber
visualization variables, a comprehensive review of literature was performed to identify
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how each variable is visualized. From this review three visualization techniques were
selected to be utilized as a visualization technique within phase two. A visual
representation of the cyber visualization variable was then mocked up using each
visualization technique. SMEs were then presented three images and asked to select the
visualization technique most relevant to displaying data related to the critical cyber
visualization variable. The results for each critical cyber visualization variable are as
follows.
For workplace satisfaction, when presented with the options of a line graph, bar
graph, and calendar style view, SMEs identified the line graph as the most valid
visualization technique. When presented with an area chart, radar plot, and streamgraph
for change in violation pattern, SMEs identified the area chart as the most valid
visualization technique. For audit log modification, when presented with a line graph,
fisheye distortion, and bar graph, SMEs identified the line graph as the most valid
visualization technique. For the critical cyber visualization variable, change in violation
pattern when presented with a stacked column graph, a stacked bar graph, and a
streamgraph, SMEs identified the stacked column graph as the most valid visualization
technique. For data exfiltration, when presented with a line graph, column graph, and
fisheye distortion, SMEs identified the line graph as the most valid visualization
technique. When presented with a line graph, stacked bars, and stacked columns for the
critical cyber visualization variable, privilege change, SMEs identified the line graph as
the most valid visualization technique.
To identify visualization techniques are most valid to present complex cyber data
correlations, the SMEs were presented with three images showing the relationship
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between two or more data variables. The visualization techniques used to present
complex cyber data correlations were parallel coordinates, chord diagram, and
hierarchical bundling. SMEs identified parallel coordinates as the most valid
visualization technique. Since the visualization method identified only varied from the
next option by one response, the focus group was sought for additional input. A parallel
coordinate was identified as allowing for clear identification of scores. If an SME were in
a critical situation and needed to make decisions quickly, a parallel coordinate would
allow for faster identification of an issue versus a chord diagram.
In phase three, the perceived effectiveness for the top six critical cyber
visualization variables was determined using the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid.
Table 32 represents the overall effectiveness for all the validated items. Within the ValueSatisfaction Dimension Grids (Figures 14-19) the mean satisfaction scores are on the
horizontal axis while the mean value scores are on the vertical axis. The results of the
Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for workplace satisfaction (Figure 14) indicate that
the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are high-value-high-satisfaction. This
implies that the critical cyber visualization variable, workplace satisfaction is of high
importance to SMEs and the SMEs had high satisfaction with this variable. The results of
the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for change in violation patterns (Figure 15)
indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are high-value-highsatisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber visualization variable, change in violation
patterns is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had high satisfaction with this
variable. The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for audit log
modifications (Figure 16) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are
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high-value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber visualization
variable, audit log modifications is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had
moderate satisfaction with this variable.
The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid for change in data access
patterns (Figure 17) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness dimensions are highvalue-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber visualization variable,
change in data access patterns is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had
moderate satisfaction with this variable. The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension
Grid for data exfiltration (Figure 18) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness
dimensions are high-value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber
visualization variable, data exfiltration is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had
moderate satisfaction with this variable. The results of the Value-Satisfaction Dimension
Grid for privilege change (Figure 19) indicate that the SMEs perceived effectiveness
dimensions are high-value-moderate-satisfaction. This implies that the critical cyber
visualization variable, privilege change is of high importance to SMEs and the SMEs had
moderate satisfaction with this variable.
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Table 28
LeVIS Index Results for Perceived Effectiveness Summary
Item
Variable 1: Workplace Satisfaction
Variable 2: Change in Violation Patterns
Variable 3: Audit Log Modification
Variable 4: Changes in Data Access Patterns
Variable 5: Data Exfiltration
Variable 6: Privilege Change
Complex Cyber Data Correlations
Type of Variables Presented
Interest in Variables Presented
Organization of Variables Presented
Complexity Based on Variables Presented
Various Variables Were Well Integrated
Relevance of Variables to Insider Threat Detection
Quality of Visualizations
Organization of Visualizations Presented
Consistency of Visualizations Presented
Ability to Quickly Decipher Potential Insider Threats
Confidence quickly Deciphering Potential Insider Threats
Ability to Make Actionable Decisions Based on Information
Depicted
Ease of Use of Information Depicted
Overall, how would you rate your level of satisfaction/value of
QUICK.v™ when identifying potentially malicious cyber
insiders?

Perceived as
Effective?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
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Figure 14: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 1: Workplace
Satisfaction

Figure 15: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 2: Change in Violation
Patterns
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Figure 16: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 3: Audit Log
Modification

Figure 17: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 4: Change in Data
Access Patterns
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Figure 18: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 5: Data Exfiltration

Figure 19: Value-Satisfaction Dimension Grid
Critical Cyber Visualization Variable 6: Privilege Change
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
Financial and intellectual property damages continue to rise as a result of insider
threats (Cole, 2015; Gorg et al., 2013; Inibhunu et al., 2016; Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009).
This study attempted to address the prevalent challenge within the cybersecurity industry
when detecting potentially malicious insider cyber threats and enabling the visualization
of threats as they occur. This process was conducted by developing a cyber visualization
prototype using SME validated critical cyber visualization variables and techniques. This
study achieved the five goals using a three-phased approach. First, using the Dephi
method SMEs identified and ranked the critical cyber visualization variables that should
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats.
Next, using the Delphi method SMEs identified visualization techniques that are most
valid to present complex cyber data correlations and the top six critical cyber
visualization variables. Finally, SMEs identified the perceived effectiveness of the
developed prototype QUICK.v™.

Discussion
Overall, the results of the study designated the top six critical cyber visualization
variables: workplace satisfaction, change in violation patterns, audit log modification,
changes in data access patterns, data exfiltration, and privilege change. These results
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suggest that cybersecurity analysts should initially focus on anomalies within these areas
when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider cyber threats. The results
also indicated most valid visualization technique to present complex cyber data
correlations are parallel coordinates. The most valid visualization technique to present the
top six critical cyber visualization variables are: line graph, area chart, line graph, stacked
column graph, line graph, and line graph (denoted in the order that each variable was
previously listed). The results also identified parallel coordinates as the most valid to
present complex cyber data correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical cyber
visualization variables. This suggests that cybersecurity analysts should be presented
simplified visualizations using these visualization techniques when presenting the critical
cyber visualization variables.
Overall, QUICK.v™ was not implied to be effective based on the SMEs’ overall
perceived effectiveness rating (i.e. satisfaction & value/importance) when mitigating
potentially malicious cyber insider threats. However, each of the identified individual
critical cyber visualization variables was found to be effective. Perceived effectiveness
was also implied for the following items: complex cyber data correlations, the types of
variables presented, interest in the variables presented, relevance of the variables to
insider threat detection, quality of visualizations, consistency of visualizations presented,
confidence quickly deciphering potential insider threats, and ease of use of information
depicted. Perceived effectiveness was not implied for the following items: organization of
variables presented, complexity based on variables presented, various variables were well
integrated, organization of visualizations presented, ability to quickly decipher potential
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insider threats, ability to make actionable decisions based on information depicted, and
the overall value and satisfaction of QUICK.v™.
From the five items analyzed to determine the SUS scores, thirteen of the 25
participants had an SUS score above 70, which is deemed as acceptable. The sample
average SUS score was 66.9%. Thus the overall perceived usability or user satisfaction of
QUICK.v™ based on the five modified SUS statements fell within quartile two which is
deemed as satisfied based on the SUS Score by quartile, adjective rating, and
acceptability (Bangor et al., 2008).

Implications
There are implications of this study in relation to the existing body of knowledge
in IS and InfoSec. This study developed a novel and effective detection method for the
identification of anomalous activities when mitigating malicious insider cyber threats.
Many cybersecurity tools presenting visualizations are rarely evaluated for effectiveness
nor do they account for the needs of the user (Sethi et al., 2016). This study identified
SME validated cybersecurity vital signs, their corresponding visualization technique, and
validated the effectiveness. Since financial and intellectual property loses continue to rise
due to insider threats, it is important to ensure cybersecurity analysts are enabled to
mitigate potentially malicious cyber insider threats.
In this study, the SME data collection occurred over a span of fifteen weeks. This
time period allowed for SME participation and follow-up. Using an expert panel required
continual follow-up, which resulted in delays. Though follow-ups were found to be a
method for reducing non-response within the Delphi process, a drawback to Delphi
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process is that the questionnaire method may slow data collection (Chang et al., 2018).
This study provides companies with cybersecurity vital signs that are perceived as
effective when identifying potentially malicious cyber insiders. These cybersecurity vital
signs could assist with the identification and mitigation of malicious insiders cyber
threats.

Recommendations and Future Research
Generally, when asked to determine criticality while restricted within one
category, SMEs identified with variables that they knew they could most likely measure
or determine based on data. Thus, workplace satisfaction, a variable identified as most
critical fell to a lowered ranking within the individual category as most SMEs
acknowledged this as data they would not be able to obtain. The SMEs then selected a
choice that logically seemed more attainable to them like unauthorized or inappropriate
associations. Since this data may be possibly obtained from an employees social media
connections. Workplace satisfaction though critical was ranked lower since the data
seemed unattainable. In giving the SMEs all 45 variables to parse and select only five,
they subjectively chose what seemed most pertinent without over analysis. Future studies
would increase the validity of the identified critical cyber visualization variables.
When asked to identify valid visualization techniques though SMEs were drawn
to the more unique visualization options, they opted to select the more simple
visualization techniques. These visualization techniques were identified with being more
familiar to the SMEs. It can be denoted that the identification with more simplified
visualization techniques, in the form of lines and charts, reflects similarities to the type of
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visualizations standardized on EKGs. Like medical professionals cybersecurity
professionals may prefer simplified visualizations. It may be assumed that simplified
visualizations may reduce cognitive load during times of crisis. However, this assumption
may be further investigated within future research.

Summary
This study addressed the prevalent challenge faced within the cybersecurity
industry when detecting potentially malicious insider cyber threats, to enable
visualization of those threats as they occur (Gorg et al., 2013; Inibhunu et al., 2016;
Pfleeger & Stolfo, 2009; Patcha & Park, 2007). Insider threat, threatens personal data,
national security, as well as economic prosperity (Pfleeger et al., 2010). In cybersecurity
mitigating adverse incidents require surveillance to identify anomaly metrics and attack
patterns (Agrafiotis et al., 2015). Delays in identifying a potentially malicious cyber
insider may result in substantial losses, resulting in the deterioration of an organization
(Randazzo et al., 2005).
Detecting malicious cybersecurity insiders is a complex task since their malicious
actions take place alongside normal behavior (Azaria, Richardson, Kraus, &
Subrahmanian, 2014). Detecting misuse by malicious cybersecurity insiders involves
examining an individual’s use of information and resources to determine whether the use
is appropriate (Caputo, Maloof, & Stephens, 2009). Identifying malicious behaviors
amidst appropriate activities pose an issue. Cybersecurity analysts must identify outliers
or anomalies within a users activities utilizing information visualization (Kang & Gorg,
2011). Therefore, identifying anomalies and taking corrective action pose a challenge
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(Azaria et al., 2014).
The main goal of this research was to validate empirically a dashboard
visualization prototype for cross team collaboration and proactive responses when
reacting to malicious cybersecurity insiders. Building on the works of Albanese, Pugliese,
and Subrahmanian (2013), Boukri and Chaoui (2015), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011),
Legg et al. (2015), as well as Legg, Moffat, Nurse, and Happa (2013). Albanese et al.
(2013) developed a graphical index that would aid in providing evidence of occurrences
of an activity, and identify if a problem matches a sequence of observations. Though the
threat posed by malicious cybersecurity insiders is very real, there is a lack of actual
analysis of activity logs due to the sheer volume of activities being conducted daily (Legg
et al., 2015).
This study had five specific goals. The first research goal was to identify the
critical cyber visualization variables. The second research goal was to identify the rank
order of the critical cyber visualization variables that the developed prototype should
include, which may aid in identifying potentially malicious cyber insiders. The third
research goal was to identify the most valid presentation of complex data correlations
using the identified critical visualization variables over multiple visualization techniques.
The fourth research goal was to apply SMEs’ identified critical visualization variables, in
rank order, and techniques to develop QUICK.v™. The fifth research goal was to
conduct an experimental study to assess the perceived effectiveness using self-reported
value and satisfaction of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating malicious cyber
insiders.
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In phase one, an exploratory study was conducted. Cybersecurity SMEs were
solicited from the researches LinkedIn professional contacts to answer the following
research questions:
RQ1: What are SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization variables that should
be displayed when using applications to detect potentially malicious insider
cyber threats?
RQ2: What is the rank order of the SMEs' identified critical cyber visualization
variables that should be displayed when developing a cyber insider threat
dashboard visualization prototype to detect potentially malicious cyber
insider activities?
The Delphi method was used in order to obtain consensus among SMEs on the
identified critical cyber visualization variables and their corresponding rank order. The
result of the survey was the identified top six critical cyber visualization variables.
Once the SMEs identified and validated the top six critical cyber visualization
variables, a comprehensive review of literature was performed to identify how each
variable is visually represented. In phase two, data collection was performed with
cybersecurity and visualization SMEs. The SMEs consisted of cybersecurity and
visualization professionals. These individuals were sourced from the researchers
LinkedIn network. In phase two, SMEs were then presented three images and asked to
select the visualization technique most relevant to displaying data related to the critical
cyber visualization variable, in order to answer the following research questions:
RQ3: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
complex cyber data correlations relevant to the pre-designated critical
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cyber visualization variables that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
RQ4: What SMEs’ identified visualization techniques are most valid to present
top six critical cyber visualization variables to detect potentially malicious
cyber insider activities that are applied within the developed cyber
visualization prototype QUICK.v™?
In phase three, qualitative and quantitative data was collected from cybersecurity
and visualization professionals. SMEs were asked to view the developed prototype and
identify level of satisfaction and importance in order to answer the following research
question:
RQ5: What is the SMEs’ perceived effectiveness (i.e. satisfaction &
value/importance) of the QUICK.v™ prototype when mitigating potentially
malicious cyber insider threats?
This study made several contributions to Information Systems and Information
Security body of knowledge by developing a novel and effective detection method for the
identification of anomalous activities when mitigating malicious insider cyber threats.
The study provided empirical evidence regarding the magnitude of endless alerts,
increasing the time required for decision-making when identifying potentially malicious
insiders cyber threats. Given the significant financial and intellectual property damage
posed to organizations, the results of this study provides organizations with empirical
evidence of how to visualize cybersecurity vital signs pertinent to the identification of
malicious cyber insiders. Lack of identification and mitigation of potentially malicious
cyber insider threats could result in substantial financial losses for an organization, or
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government entity.
In conclusion, organizations can use the identified cybersecurity vital signs and
the validated visualization techniques to aid in the identification of malicious insiders.
QUICK.v™ addressed the challenge of detecting cyber insider threats in an
unconventional way by enhancing the presentation of complex malicious insider cyber
threat correlations. In addition, QUICK.v™ can be used as a guide for alleviating the
issues faced when using visualizations to identify potentially malicious insiders cyber
threats.
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Appendix A
Qualitative Survey Instrument 1(TEMPLATE): Instrument for SMEs
Identification of Cyber Visualization Variables
Please read the following instructions and definitions before completing this survey
The purpose of this survey is to identify cyber visualization variables (analytic variable or
outputs that may indicate an insider threat and prompts for further analysis) that a cyber
specific information visualization should include that may aid in identifying potentially
malicious insiders cyber threats.
Please respond to all questions as honestly and accurately as possible. By completing this
survey you agree and understand that your responses are voluntary. Measures were taken
to ensure that responses are anonymous and cannot be traced to any individual. You may
exit this survey at any time. In the event that you chose to exit this survey, your responses
will not be recorded. By participating in this survey you certify that you are over the age
of 18 years old.
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers in critical industries (White House, 2009).
Cybersecurity – Prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if
needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Axelrod, 2006).
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014).
Insider Threat - Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data,
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010).
Intrusion Detection System - Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013).
Malicious Insider - Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best
interests of the organization (Santos et al., 2012).
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Section A
Initial Cyber Visualization Variables
From the cyber visualization variables presented below, place an x next to the variables
that a most important to you when trying to identify potentially malicious insider threats.
(Example: Based on the sample list below – ‘System authentication and authorization failures’)
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1. List any additional cyber visualization variables you think will support the
identification of potentially malicious insiders cyber threats, that are not listed
above.
(Example: Based on the sample list above – ‘System authentication and
authorization failures’)
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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2. From all the variables identified above, please think of issues related to insider
threat detection and list only the top 5 variables important to you when
identifying potentially malicious insider threats.
1. _____________________________________________________
2. _____________________________________________________
3. _____________________________________________________
4. _____________________________________________________
5. _____________________________________________________

3. From the 5 variables identified in Question 2, please think of issues related to
insider threat detection and rank the variables from most important to least
important (1 – least important and 5- most important).
1. _____________________________________________________
2. _____________________________________________________
3. _____________________________________________________
4. _____________________________________________________
5. _____________________________________________________
4. What are the positives of using the 5 variables identified in Question 2 when
identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________

5. Are there any negatives associated with using the 5 variables identified in
Question 2 when identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats?
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
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__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
Section B
Demographic Information
What is your job function?
(A) Administrative staff
(B) Cybersecurity/IT staff
(C) Engineer
(D) Manager
(E) Operations
(F) Professional staff
(G) Security operator
(H) Technical staff
(I) Other __________________
How long have you been with your current organization?
(A) Under 1 year
(B) 1 – 5 years
(C) 6 – 10 years
(D) 11 – 15 years
(E) 16 – 20 years
(F) 21 – 25 years
(G) 26 – 30 years
(H) Over 30 years
Which describes your current employer?
(A) Academia
(B) Federal government employee
(C) Private sector company
(D) State government employee
(E) Other __________________
What is your highest level of education?
(A) High school diploma
(B) 2-year college (Associates degree)
(C) 4-year college (Bachelors degree)
(D) Graduate degree
(E) Doctorate
(F) Other
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Do you currently hold any cybersecurity certifications, if so how many do you possess?
(A) 0
(B) 1
(C) 2
(D) 3
(E) 4
(F) 5 or more
What is your age?
(A) Under 20
(B) 20-29
(C) 30-39
(D) 40-49
(E) 50-59
(F) Over 60
What is your gender?
(A) Female
(B) Male

148

Appendix B
Qualitative Survey Instrument 2 (TEMPLATE): Instrument for SME
Identification of Visualization Technique for Cyber Variables
Please read the following definitions before completing this survey

This Appendix is only a template since the top six critical cyber visualization variables
will not be finalized until the completion of Appendix A. Thus, allowing for the
identification of the most valid visualization techniques to present the top six critical
cyber visualization variables, therefore, this Appendix is only for illustration purposes.
The purpose of this survey is to identify the visualization techniques best suited to present
the cyber visualization variables previously identified by SMEs that may aid in
identifying potentially malicious insiders cyber threats.
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers in critical industries (White House, 2009).
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014).
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014).
Insider Threat - Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data,
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010).
Intrusion Detection System - Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013).
Malicious Insider - Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best
interests of the organization (Santos et al., 2012).
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Section A
1. Please review the visualization technique used to present each of the variables
depicted below and select your preferred presentation technique for each
variable.
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Section B
Demographic Information
What is your job function?
(A) Administrative staff
(B) Cybersecurity/IT staff
(C) Engineer
(D) Manager
(E) Operations
(F) Professional staff
(G) Security operator
(H) Technical staff
(I) Other __________________
How long have you been with your current organization?
(A) Under 1 year
(B) 1 – 5 years
(C) 6 – 10 years
(D) 11 – 15 years
(E) 16 – 20 years
(F) 21 – 25 years
(G) 26 – 30 years
(H) Over 30 years
Which describes your current employer?
(A) Academia
(B) Federal government employee
(C) Private sector company
(D) State government employee
(E) Other __________________
What is your highest level of education?
(A) High school diploma
(B) 2-year college (Associates degree)
(C) 4-year college (Bachelors degree)
(D) Graduate degree
(E) Doctorate
(F) Other
Do you currently hold any cybersecurity certifications, if so how many do you possess?
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(A) 0
(B) 1
(C) 2
(D) 3
(E) 4
(F) 5 or more
What is your age?
(A) Under 20
(B) 20-29
(C) 30-39
(D) 40-49
(E) 50-59
(F) Over 60
What is your gender?
(A) Female
(B) Male
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Appendix C
Quantitative Survey Instrument 3 (TEMPLATE): Instrument for
Cybersecurity Analysts’ Perceived Effectiveness of the Prototype
Please read the following definitions before completing this survey
The purpose of this survey is to determine the perceived effectiveness of the cyber
visualization variables presented and the visualization techniques used was identified.
The instrument depicted below is a draft for the final version that was developed based
on SME input. Keep the definitions below in mind as you complete the survey.
Cyberspace or ‘Cyber’ – Independent network of IT infrastructures that includes the
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and
controllers in critical industries (White House, 2009).
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014).
Information Visualization - Communicating and perceiving data, both abstract and
scientific, through visual representations (Roberts et al., 2014).
Insider Threat - Individuals with legitimate access whose behaviors put a firm’s data,
intellectual property, systems, organizations, and businesses at risk of being attacked
(Pfleeger, Predd, Hunker, & Bulford, 2010).
Intrusion Detection System - Hardware or software that gathers and analyzes
information from various areas within a computer or a network to identify possible
security breaches, which include both intrusions and misuse (NIST, 2013).
Malicious Insider - Is an insider who has malicious intent that acts against the best
interests of the organization (Santos et al., 2012).
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Section A
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Section B
Demographic Information
What is your job function?
(A) Administrative staff
(B) Cybersecurity/IT staff
(C) Engineer
(D) Manager
(E) Operations
(F) Professional staff
(G) Security operator
(H) Technical staff
(I) Other __________________
How long have you been with your current organization?
(A) Under 1 year
(B) 1 – 5 years
(C) 6 – 10 years
(D) 11 – 15 years
(E) 16 – 20 years
(F) 21 – 25 years
(G) 26 – 30 years
(H) Over 30 years
Which describes your current employer?
(A) Academia
(B) Federal government employee
(C) Private sector company
(D) State government employee
(E) Other __________________
What is your highest level of education?
(A) High school diploma
(B) 2-year college (Associates degree)
(C) 4-year college (Bachelors degree)
(D) Graduate degree
(E) Doctorate
(F) Other
Do you currently hold any cybersecurity certifications, if so how many do you possess?
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(A) 0
(B) 1
(C) 2
(D) 3
(E) 4
(F) 5 or more
What is your age?
(A) Under 20
(B) 20-29
(C) 30-39
(D) 40-49
(E) 50-59
(F) Over 60
What is your gender?
(A) Female
(B) Male
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Appendix D
Qualitative Survey Instrument 1 (FINAL): Email to SMEs
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Appendix E
Qualitative Survey Instrument 1 (FINAL): Instrument for SMEs
Identification of Cyber Visualization Variables
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Appendix F
Qualitative Survey Instrument 2 (FINAL): Email to SMEs

166

Appendix G
Qualitative Survey Instrument 2 (FINAL): Instrument for SME
Identification of Visualization Technique for Cyber Variables
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Appendix H
Qualitative Survey Instrument 3 (FINAL): Email to SMEs
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Appendix I
Quantitative Survey Instrument 3 (FINAL): Instrument for Cybersecurity
Analysts’ Perceived Effectiveness of the Prototype
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Developed Prototype QUICK.v™ (FINAL)
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